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UPJOHN: A NEW PRESCRIPTION FOR THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DEFENSES IN
ADMINOSTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
ROBERT G. NATH*
INTRODUCTION
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,1 the Supreme Court has set-
tled an important controversy over the scope of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, and has announced guidelines for the in-
vocation of thework-product doctrine during an administrative in-
vestigation. The privilege dispute had split District Courts,2
Circuit Courts of Appeals,' even the Supreme Court itself. 4 In
* Trial Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, J.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1974, M.L.T., Georgetown University, 1980. The views expressed in this arti-
cle are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Department of Justice. The author was one of the Government's trial counsel in
Upjohn.
1. 449 U.S. 383 (1981), rev'g and remanding, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
2. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978) (some
discovery allowed based on the control group and subject matter tests); Hercules, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977) (discovery allowed using control group test);
Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (discovery allowed using control group test); Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp. et.
al., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974) (special master appointed to review documents based on
control group test); Duplan Corp. et. al. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C.
1974), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976) (some discovery allowed: both tests adopted);
Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1974), afl'd, 534
F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976) (discovery denied using subject matter test); Xerox Corp. v. Inter-
national Business Machines Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (special master "inclined"
to accept subject matter test); Hasso v. Retail Credit Corp., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(discovery denied based on subject matter test); Honeywell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50
F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (discovery allowed: control group test adopted); Leve v. General
Motors Corp., 43 F.R.D. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (discovery denied: control group test arguably
adopted); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (control
group test adopted). See also notes 7 & 8 infra.
3. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Company), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1979) (control group test adopted); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated December 19, 1978,
599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (court noted conflict between privilege tests); Diversified Indus-
tries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'g 527 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977)
(discovery denied using modified subject matter test); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco
Gateway Corp., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'g 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (affirming
lower court which used subject matter test); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968)
12 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
Upjohn, the Court announced two broad5 doctrines: (1) the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege shelters the communications to law-
yers not only of top management (the "control group"7 ), but also
of any employee, if the communication concerns corporate duties$
(discovery allowed using control group test).
4. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by
an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (discovery denied in part based on subject
matter test).
5. Despite Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opening language, "[w]e decline to lay down a broad
rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area," 449 U.S. at
386, the implications of the opinion are indeed very broad, as the remainder of this article
will show.
6. The attorney-client privilege has received many formulations. Probably the most fa-
mous is that of Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59.
See generally Kidston, Privileged Communications, 34 Bus. LAw 853 (1978); Kobak, The
Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339 (1972). It is not surprising that an issue which affects the legal
profession itself so deeply, as well as affecting numerous important corporate clients, would
attract amicus briefs. Filing such briefs in the Supreme Court were the New England Legal
Foundation, the American College of Trial Lawyers on behalf of itself and 33 law firms
(brief by Dean Erwin N. Griswold), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and
the Federal Bar Association. Every one of these amici argued for reversal.
7. The control group test was announced in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub
nom.; General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
943 (1963):
[Ihf the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of an attorney, or if he is
an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply.
210 F. Supp. at 485.
8. The "corporate duties" language derives from the subject matter test, which was first
set forth in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communi-
cation to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the
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and the other standards of the privilege are met, and (2) the work-
product doctrine applies in full force at the administrative level of
an Internal Revenue Service investigation; only an extremely
strong showing of need will overcome it.9
Bare recitation of these doctrines, however, cannot convey how
greatly Upjohn departed from the holdings, and the tone, of prece-
dent. On the same attorney-client privilege issue at least two pre-
sent Justices of the Court (and possibly four) had voted to the con-
trary just ten years earlier. 10 Respectable arguments existed on
both sides of the privilege issue,1 ' yet only two of the arguments
marshalled against the Court's position were discussed, in abbrevi-
ated fashion, in the unanimous opinion.' 2 Past decisions, particu-
larly in the tax enforcement field, had shown the Supreme Court to
be hostile to many varieties of privilege claims, especially when
made by corporations. The decision in Upjohn went at least as far
as, if not farther than, Upjohn urged, to protect the attorney-client
privilege in general, and a corporation's assertion of it in particu-
communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the
subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation
and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the
duties of his employment.
Id. at 491-92. This pronouncement was a bold but unsupported step, since the test appears
to have been crafted in the case out of thin air. There is no citation to authority, no discus-
sion of the history, nature and purposes of the privilege, nor any analysis of how the new
test would promote it.
The difference between the two tests has been eloquently summarized as follows:
The control group test treats those employees not vested with high decision
making authority as third parties to the attorney-client relationship. The subject
matter test, on the other hand, envisages protection for communications by
those employees who have acquired information during the course of their em-
ployment, but excludes from its scope declarations by these same persons should
they be mere witnesses.
Note, Should Lawyers Serve as Directors of Corporations for which They Act as Counsel?,
1978 UTAH L. REv. 711, 733-34 n.92 (1978).
It seems clear that the Supreme Court effectively endorsed the subject matter test in
Upjohn; every one of that test's elements (and more) were present in the case. 449 U.S. at
394-95.
9. 449 U.S. at 397-402.
10. When Harper & Row Publishers, 423 F.2d 487, was decided, Justices Black, Doug-
las and Harlan were members of the Court. Justice Douglas did not take part in the deci-
sion. Thus, assuming Justices Black and Harlan had voted to reverse, it is mathematically
certain that at least two, and possibly four, of the present members of the Court have re-
versed their positions by their votes in Upjohn.
11. See text accompanying notes 95-140.
12. 449 U.S. at 390, 395, 399.
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lar. Past decisions had nurtured an atmosphere friendly to law en-
forcement; Upjohn ran counter to that trend, unexpectedly in the
course of an Internal Revenue Service criminal tax investigation
involving allegations of foreign bribery, where prosecution loomed,
and where Upjohn had hampered the IRS' investigative efforts by
forbidding its employees to cooperate fully in the investigation.
Despite contrary precedent, the Court may have elevated the
work-product doctrine to the status of privilege with respect to one
class of work product. It also erected what will likely prove to be
insurmountable barriers to overcoming work-product protection.
In so doing, the Court expanded the doctrine beyond either its
original or later-developed confines, and beyond what was neces-
sary to the result of the case.
In an earlier age, the attorney-client privilege was a simpler
concept because it was clear who the client was.13 The client, usu-
ally an individual, needed a privilege because he could not obtain
effective legal advice without the unfettered discretion to reveal
the full dimensions of a legal problem. He could have confidence
that the lawyer's resulting advice would be predicated on his can-
dor.14 Our complex system of laws, which demands the expert as-
sistance of a lawyer, would be jeopardized unless the client (includ-
13. See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2399 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); 8
WRIGHT & MMLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIvm §§ 2017, 2021-28 (1970). Wig-
more describes the privilege as dating from 1577, during the reign of Elizabeth I, where its
existence was "unquestioned." Bird v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577); Dennis v. Co-
drington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580). It arose as a naturally-occurring exception to the then-
novel right to compel everyone's testimony, and as an adjunct to the oath taken by attor-
neys and barristers to keep the secrets of their clients. This doctrine gradually lost ground,
and was repudiated entirely by the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The original the-
ory, which exempted the lawyer, not the client, from compelled testimony, was limited to
communications generated after litigation had begun.
14. The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, ABA
CANON No. 4, requires lawyers to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client. Ethical
Consideration No. 4-1 [hereinafter cited as EC] describes the fiduciary relationship between
lawyer and client, holding that the proper functioning of the legal system requires the pres-
ervation by the lawyer of the client's confidences and secrets. In terms reminiscent of the
present justification for the attorney-client privilege, this canon notes that there must exist
a freedom of consultation between lawyer and client, and that a lawyer must be fully in-
formed of all the facts in order for the client to obtain full advantage of the legal system.
However, EC 4-4 holds that the attorney-client privilege is narrower than the ethical duty to
guard a client's secrets, since the latter exists "without regard to the nature or source of
information or the fact that others share the knowledge." The ethical duty, like the privi-
lege, survives the termination of the professional relationship. EC 4-6. See Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 623, 634 nn.17, 18 (9th Cir. 1960).
ing a corporation)15 is assured of a privilege which nurtures full
freedom of communication. But who is the "client" when a modern
corporation may employ over one million persons" and do business
in dozens of foreign countries?17 Should the "client" encompass all
employees (the "subject matter" test), or merely top management
who make the decisions based on legal advice (the "control group"
test)? This was how the first issue was framed.
The work-product doctrine, although said to be of ancient ori-
gin,18 was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1947
decision, Hickman v. Taylor.19 The work-product doctrine protects
primarily the lawyer, not the client. Courts have recognized it over
the years as a rule of procedure applicable when sharply adverse
interests are set against each other in a lawsuit. Should it apply at
all prior to such a setting? Do the features of an administrative
investigation undercut, or override the dangers sought to be fore-
stalled by the work-product doctrine? What should be the effect of
the principle that in administrative agency inquiries, the law rec-
ognizes an imbalance of interests favoring disclosure? What quan-
tum of need should be required to overcome work-product doctrine
protection? Thus was the second problem posed.
The events which focused attention on these issues began as
fallout from the Watergate era, when it was revealed that large
multi-national corporations had engaged in a regular business
practice and policy of bribing domestic and/or foreign persons and/
or governmental officials in order to advance their business inter-
15. It is now universally held that the privilege applies to corporations. Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. American Gas Assoc., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). See also United States v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691
(10th Cir. 1968) (patent suit involving Phillips Petroleum Corporation). This result was not
always so clear. In Radiant Burners, Chief Judge Campbell cogently analyzed the privilege
and its history, arriving at the conclusion that, like the privilege against self-incrimination,
the attorney-client privilege was historically confined to individuals and ought to remain so.
This decision, as could well be imagined, caused consternation in the legal and business
community before it was reversed.
16. See, e.g., Annual Report, American Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (1979),
noting that in 1979, AT&T employed over one million people.
17. Id.; United States v. Upjohn Company, 600 F.2d at 1225. See also In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1227 (3d Cir. 1979).
18. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 n.19 (1947); 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 13, § 2319; Annot., The Development, Since Hickman v. Taylor, of the Attorney's
"Work Product" Doctrine, 35 A.L.R.3d 412 (1971).
19. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2319.
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ests.2 0 They made these payments (usually called "questionable
payments") through fictitious accounts, or in cash (commonly
known as "slush funds").21 Anticipating (and often already under)
administrative investigation by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Internal Revenue Service as a result of these prac-
tices,22 the corporations (and their lawyers) typically conducted
their own internal investigations of these questionable payments
practices. Government compulsory process and private litigation
swiftly followed demanding production of the results. The corpora-
tions uniformly invoked as defenses the attorney-client privilege"8
and work-product doctrine.24
20. Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue Alexander
reveals that three hundred corporations had maintained "slush funds" for payment of
bribes and kickbacks to foreign and domestic government officials). See also Alfred, Corpo-
rate Slush Funds: The Deductibility of "Sensitive" Payments, 4 J. CoRP. TAx. 130 (1977);
Note, A Look at Questionable or Illegal Payments by American Corporations to Foreign
Government Officials, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 496 (1976).
21. Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1978); Alfred, supra
note 20. At trial, Upjohn's General Counsel described a slush fund as "a fund of money,
usually in cash, usually off the books, that a company generates for improper or illegal
purposes."
22. The Service's authority to conduct investigations of possible violations of the tax
laws, whether civil or criminal, is contained in 26 U.S.C. § 7601 (1976). The Supreme Court
has characterized this power as nearly plenary. Like other administrative agencies, the Ser-
vice is empowered to inquire where the law has been violated or merely because it wants
assurance that it has not. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 148 (1975); United States
v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
642-43 (1950)). See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1971). The Ser-
vice's power has often been analogized to that of a grand jury. United States v. Rosinsky,
547 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); United States v. Foster, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). The power and authority of the SEC are similarly
broad in the enforcement of the securities laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 77t (1976). See Securities
& Exchange Comm'n v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1978); Mines & Metal Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 200
F.2d 317, 319 n.1-3, 321 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953). See also Civil
Aeronautics Board v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
23. Unlike the work-product doctrine prior to Upjohn, there is no dispute that the
attorney-client privilege is available as a defense to an IRS summons. Reisman v. Caplin,
375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) (held that the summons may be contested on "any appropriate
ground," and that the attorney-client privilege is one such ground). Accord United States v.
Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
24. The result was a spate of conflicting precedent. See Harper & Row Publishers, 423
F.2d 487, aff'd by equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), where the Supreme Court
issued no decision in the case which first proposed the subject matter test. The conflict as a
result of which certiorari was granted had generated significant appellate and district court
litigation, in the context of both private litigation and governmental investigations. See
UPJOHN
This article will explore the background of the issues the
Court addressed in Upjohn, and how the decision is understanda-
ble, if not entirely defensible, in view of apparently conflicting pre-
cedent. Part II will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the
Court's privilege and work-product holdings, emphasizing the in-
compatibility of the Court's holdings with traditional concepts of
privilege and work-product. Part Ill will analyze the impact of the
ruling on other subdoctrines and requirements of the privilege, and
the far-reaching, possibly dangerous implications they harbor for
the judicial fact-finding process. Upjohn's important, but largely
ignored, implications for lawyers' ethics and employees' constitu-
tional rights will be treated in Part IV.
I. BACKGROUND OF UPJOHN: DISCOVERING THE SKELETONS
Upjohn Company is a major multi-national corporation en-
gaged principally in the manufacture and distribution of
pharmaceuticals. Its 1975 sales approached $900 million. Its gen-
eral structure consists of a parent, foreign subsidiaries and foreign
branches of United States subsidiaries. Upjohn operates in more
than 150 foreign countries and files consolidated federal income
tax returns.2 5
In January, 1976, Upjohn's independent auditors notified Ge-
rard Thomas, Upjohn's general counsel, that one foreign subsidiary
(Upjohn International, Inc.) had made direct or indirect payments
to foreign government employees to secure additional business. Mr.
Thomas brought this fact to the attention of R.T. Parfet, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board, and to the Board itself. The Board passed
a resolution appointing Thomas to conduct a factual investigation
with the help of outside counsel to determine the extent and scope
notes 2-4 supra. It has also generated significant scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Simon,
The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956); Wein-
schel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. IND. &
CoMM. L. REv. 873 (1971); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The
Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REv. 424 (1970); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Look at Its Effect on the Corporate Client and the Corporate Executive, 55 IND. L.J. 407
(1980); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Di-
versified Industries v. Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 699 (1979).
25. United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,597, 83,598 (Magistrate's Report
and Recommendation), aff'd, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,152 (W.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d
1123 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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of these "questionable"26 payments, and to be in a position to give
legal advice with respect to the payments.27 Thomas eventually
discovered that Upjohn had been making payments at an average
rate of $1 million per year from 1971 through 1974.28
Thomas conducted the internal investigation by mailing a
written questionnaire under the authority of the Chairman of the
Board to fifty-three foreign general and area managers of Upjohn,
and by conducting interviews with the respondents and others.2 In
his transmittal letter accompanying each questionnaire, Chairman
Parfet requested the respondent to cooperate completely and to
answer all questions thoroughly.30
26. The payments are "questionable" because of their dubious legality or deductibility.
Bribery of foreign government officials is illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff. See Maurice, Questionable Overseas Pay-
ments: Going Around One More Time, 15 GONZAGA L. REV. 459 (1980).
The payments are not deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 26
U.S.C. § 162(c) (1976). When they are deducted under a fictitous account, the act may con-
stitute tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976)) or the filing of a false return (26 U.S.C. § 7206
(1976)).
27. There appears to be no difference between house counsel's and outside counsel's
privilege. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Exxon, 65 F.R.D. 26, 36-37 (D. Md. 1974); Airshield
v. Air Reduction, 46 F.R.D. 96, 97 (N.D. IlM. 1968); Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45 F.R.D.
24, 26 (D. Minn. 1968); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Construction Co., 285 F.
Supp. 868, 869 (D. Kan. 1968); Paper Converting Machine Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp.
249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (patent counsel); United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 89 F.
Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950). House counsel practices in a like manner as outside counsel,
and while house counsel may have additional concerns regarding its role, especially ethical
concerns, see Section III & accompanying notes, these should make no difference in the
degree or applicability of the privilege. See Simon, supra note 24; Kobak, The Uneven
Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 6.
28. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,599.
29. Id. The interviews were conducted with a total of 86 persons either in person, by
telephone, or both.
30. Respondents' Exhibit 3, attached to Affidavit of Gerard Thomas, introduced in evi-
dence: "The subject matter [of Mr. Thomas' inquiry] must be treated as highly confidential
and is not to be discussed with or disclosed to anyone other than Gerard Thomas or individ-
uals he shall designate.... It is imperative that you be completely candid and cooperate
fully in responding to questions and requests for information."
The importance of these interview notes and questionnaire responses to an IRS or SEC
investigation can hardly be overstated. These agencies frequently begin their inquiries many
years after the events involved. By then, memories have faded and records have been lost.
Investigators also know that when the interviewee is questioned by his chairman of the
board, and later by the corporation's lawyers, a far different attitude prevails than when the
questioning is done by an IRS agent. The interviews and questionnaires generated by the
corporation itself are highly likely to reveal the unvarnished truth. Even if the witness is
available, the prior statements have obvious utility, at the very least for impeachment
purposes.
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On March 26, 1976, Upjohn filed a Form 8-K31 with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, disclosing that since January 1,
1971, it had made payments totalling $2.71 million in twenty-two
foreign countries. Upjohn also sought refuge under the SEC's Vol-
untary Disclosure Program32 by agreeing with the SEC to furnish
such underlying data as the Commission might request to verify
the 8-K revelations. 3 On July 26, 1976, Upjohn amended its earlier
8-K by disclosing additional payments; the new total reached $4.4
million. It sent copies of both reports to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Audit Division34 agents who were examining the company's
1972 and 1973 consolidated federal income tax returns. The agents
referred the case to the Intelligence Division, 5 whose special
31. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970) re-
quires corporations subject to the registration requirements of the Act to submit to the SEC
periodic reports disclosing such information as the Commission may require. Form 8-K is
used for current reports. SEC Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1980). It man-
dates disclosure of large acquisitions and dispositions of assets, declarations of bankruptcy
or receivership, director resignations, and other major corporate events. 42 Fed. Reg. 4429
(1977). The filer must also disclose such additional information as will make the filing of the
registration statement not misleading under the surrounding circumstances. SEC Rules and
Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1981).
32. The Voluntary Disclosure Program was announced by the SEC on May 19, 1976.
[1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,600. Its major features were that a corporation which
had engaged in illegal or questionable payments could voluntarily submit a report (current
on Form 8-K, annual on Form 10-K), together with a promise to disclose to the SEC the
underlying details of the reported acts, and not face the SEC's enforcement powers. See
SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRAC-
TICES (1972).
33. The Magistrate later saw that promise as a factor in his holding that Upjohn had
waived whatever privilege it previously enjoyed. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,603.
34. The Audit Division is now the Examination Division. See United States v. LaSalle
National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 300 n.1 (1978) (citing IRS News Release, Feb. 6, 1978).
35. The Intelligence Division is now the Criminal Investigation Division. Such an inves-
tigation is initially aimed simply at obtaining the facts, but may have either or both civil or
criminal outcomes. The investigation usually begins with an audit of a taxpayer's return
(and did so in Upjohn's case) by one or more Revenue Agents of the Examination Division.
While Revenue Agents are empowered to issue summonses, see DELEGATION ORDER No. 4
(Rev. 11), 1980-2 C.B. 752, there are usually few occasions to do so. If, during the course of
an examination, the Revenue Agent discovers unexplained indications of fraud, he is re-
quired to suspend his audit and refer the case to the Criminal Investigation Division. See
United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 30Q n.1 (1978); United States v.
Gilpin, 542 F.2d 38, 40-41 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lockyear, 448 F.2d 417, 420 &
n.2 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 & nn.2-4 (D. Md.
1968). The Special Agents of the Criminal Investigation Division determine whether a tax-
payer's alleged understatement of income or false statement warrants criminal prosecution.
The outcome of an Examination Division examination is (1) no change, (2) a deficiency, or
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agents are charged with investigating potential violations of the
criminal provisions of the revenue laws, such as tax evasion, 6 filing
a false return, 7 or making a false statement.8
Upjohn also furnished two schedules to the IRS. One summa-
rized the component parts of $700,000 in payments which Upjohn
made during 1971-76 and which it conceded affected the correct-
ness of its returns for the investigated years. The other was a coun-
try-by-country summary of payments totalling $3.7 million made
in connection with Upjohn's foreign operations, which payments
Upjohn contended would have no effect on its tax liabilities or on
the correctness of its tax returns.3 9 In addition, and of significance
to the District Court's work product discussion, Upjohn offered to
make available to the IRS the employees whom Thomas had
interviewed, but would not allow the special agent to examine
them about transactions Upjohn deemed irrelevant to the tax
investigation.
The assigned special agent requested the interview notes and
questionnaire results of Upjohn's internal investigation, and when
(3) a refund, together with applicable interest and penalties including the fraud penalty.
I.R.C. § 6653(b). The outcome of a C.LD. investigation could be a recommendation to the
Examination Division for any one of these courses, or it could be a recommendation for
criminal prosecution of the taxpayer. United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. at 931-32 &
nn.2-4.
36. I.R.C. § 7201.
37. I.R.C. § 7207.
38. LR.C. § 7206.
39. This stance ripened in the litigation to the defense that the summoned data were
not "relevant" to the IRS' investigation, and since relevance was one of the four standards
for enforcement erected by United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964), enforcement
should be denied. The general standard of relevance is whether the data "might have
thrown light upon the correctness of the taxpayer's returns" or the correct amount of his
liabilities. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting Foster v.
United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1960)). Accord,
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
This liberal standard is a product of the following: the Service's power to inquire is broad; it
cannot state the exact relevance of data it does not possess; deference should be given to the
Service, at the administrative level, as to materials it may examine since the matter is not
accusatory and may result in outcomes favorable to the taxpayer. See Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289-94 (1965); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420,
430-33 (N.D. Ill. 1972), afl'd, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Acker, 325 F.
Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Magistrate eventually rejected Upjohn's contention on this
point, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,597 at 83,605-08 (W.D. Mich. 1978), as did the Court of Ap.-
peals. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1228 n.13 (6th Cir. 1979), af'g in part,
78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,152 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
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he was refused, issued a summons ° to Upjohn and Gerard
Thomas, Upjohn's general counsel, for these notes and question-
naire results. Upjohn refused to comply with the summons, and
the government brought an enforcement action.41 Upjohn raised
the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine as affirma-
tive defenses. 4 2
The Magistrate (to whom the case had been referred for a rec-
ommended decision) 4' squarely faced a choice between the two
40. I.R.C. § 7602 provides:
§ 7602. Examination of Books and Witnesses
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a re-
turn where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or
fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any
such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the busi-
ness of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other
person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the
Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to
produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testi-
mony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.
41. Jurisdiction to enforce an IRS summons is granted to the district courts by LR.C.
§ 7402(b) and § 7604(a). A summons enforcement proceeding, though not a plenary lawsuit,
is an adversary proceeding entitling the summoned party or any proper intervenor the op-
portunity to challenge the summons on any appropriate ground, including the attorney-
client privilege. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
42. Upjohn also alleged that the data were irrelevant and were sought for an improper
criminal purpose. See note 39 supra, with respect to the rejection of the relevance claim.
The criminal purpose argument derives from a line of cases culminating in United States v.
LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, in which the "sole criminal purpose" doctrine has
been developed. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440 (dictum); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. O'Conner,
118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass 1953). This doctrine holds that if a summons is issued solely to
further a criminal prosecution of a taxpayer, and serves no civil function (i.e., no I.R.C.
§ 7602 purpose), the summons is unenforceable. The contention was n6t pressed with vigor
at the district court level and was abandoned on appeal.
43. A magistrate's authority to enforce an IRS summons has been the subject of consid-
erable controversy. Prior to 1964, it was believed that I.R.C. § 7604(b) might provide a suffi-
cient grant of jurisdiction. That statute facially grants jurisdiction to United States Com-
missioners (now magistrates) to issue contempt orders and arrest warrants if a person
neglects or refuses to obey a summons. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, however, made it
clear that § 7604(b) was confined to situations in which the summoned party "wholly made
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predominant federal law tests for discerning who is the "client" for
purposes of the corporate attorney-client privilege.44 Upjohn con-
default or contumaciously refused to comply." Id. at 448-49.
Under the law pertaining to federal magistrates in effect in 1977, the magistrate had
jurisdiction to perform non-decision-making functions in order to assist the district judge in
handling his caseload. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976). Matters could be delegated to the magis-
trate regardless of the parties' consent and the magistrate could be delegated "such addi-
tional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). This meant that where a case was assigned to a magistrate for hear-
ing, the most he could do was to make a report and recommendation to the district court,
who would then make a de novo review and, if able, enter a final judgment. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C) and concluding paragraph. The magistrate was not authorized to enter a
final order. Horton v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 403-04 (1st Cir. 1979);
United States v. Wisnowski, 580 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1978); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp., 507 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (7th Cir. 1974); Dye v. Cowan, 472 F.2d 1206, 1206 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1972). However, the de novo review of the district court did not require the taking of
new evidence. United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8th Cir. 1979).
The act was amended by the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat.
643 (1979). Now, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1979), the parties may consent to full adjudi-
cation of a case by the magistrate, including the entry of a final judgment. The constitution-
ality of this statute has not yet been tested.
44. While the court had to choose between two federal tests, it did not have to face the
tantalizing but difficult choice of law (state or federal) problems in the privilege area. The
solution to this problem was suggested in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973) (no accountant's privilege recognized in federal law and no such state privilege ap-
plied in federal courts) and apparently set forth in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976):
Federal Rule Evid. 501, effective January 2, 1975, provides that with respect
to privileges the United States district courts "shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law ... interpreted ... in the light of reason and experi-
ence." Thus, whether or not Rule 501 applies to this case, the attorney-client
privilege issue is governed by the principles and authorities discussed and cited
infra. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26.
Id. at 402 n.8. The Court reaffirmed the primacy of federal law in the determination of
testimonial privilege in federal courts in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980),
where it interpreted Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as acknowledging the au-
thority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privi-
leges. See generally Kobak, supra note 6, suggesting that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, including Rule 43, do not expressly permit federal courts to fashion rules of privilege,
and that the Tenth Amendment may well be a bar to intrusion into a state-created relation-
ship. Id. at 339-44. Kobak believes that in diversity cases, under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts would be required to adhere to state-created
privileges. Kobak, supra note 6, at 344-47. Even in federal question cases, where state inter-
ests are subordinated, Kobak suggests that absent an affirmative act by Congress, the field
is in fact left to the states. Id. at 347-52. McLaughlin, in The Treatment of the Attorney-
Client and Related Privileges in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts, 26 REc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 30 (1971), suggests that Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence abrogates state-created privileges which, up until its enactment, were
considered substantive under Erie. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 627-29 (9th Cir. 1960)
and United States v. Falsone, 205 F.2d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
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tended that its counsel's privilege encompassed all employees of
the company (including present and former interviewees) whose
duties reasonably related to the subject matter of their communi-
cations to the lawyers. This was the "subject matter" test first an-
nounced in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker.45 The government
contended that the only privileged communications - if any at all
- were those between the lawyers and Upjohn's "control group,"
that is, those individuals who had the power to control, or take a
substantial part in, the decisions about actions the corporation
might take on the advice of an attorney.46
Guided by the law's predisposition to construe privileges nar-
rowly, and by a perceived potential for abuse of the privilege in-
herent in the subject matter test,47 the Magistrate held the control
group test to be the law. He reasoned that the facts that the lower-
level employees had communicated were important to the corpora-
tion, but that these interviewees would have little role to play in
the corporation's legal decisions about those facts. Mr. Thomas
had concerned himself with potential securities laws violations, tax
consequences, currency regulations, and the like, all of which are
matters consigned to the highest level of management and hardly
the domain of the interviewees.. Therefore, the latter were not
864 (1953), gave rise to an apparent conflict over the applicability of state, as opposed to
federal, law at the administrative and enforcement levels with respect to IRS summonses.
See Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54
Mm. L. REv. 67 (1969); Note, Privileged Communications Before Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Law Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 395, esp. notes 1 & 2
(1964). See also United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324, 326 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) (fed-
eral law governs privilege issue in federal tax investigations); United States v. Ladner, 238
F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D. Miss. 1965) (there is no federal common law of privilege, state law
governs); In re Bretto, 231 F. Supp. 529, 531 (D. Minn. 1964) (parties agree Minnesota law
controls). Compare McMann v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937) with Civil Aeronautics Board v. Air Transp. Ass'n of
America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorney-client privilege applies in CAB proceed-
ings) and United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) (Rule 501 re-
quires federal common law of attorney-client privilege in IRS summons enforcement cases).
45. See note 4 supra.
46. Regarding the "control group" test, see note 7 supra.
47. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,602. The Magistrate also alluded to, but gave uncertain
weight to, the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), by ob-
serving that the notes of witness interviews were held not privileged, the Court appearing
silently to treat the interviewees as mere witnesses rather than "clients." However, the Mag-
istrate was more concerned about the "dark veil of secrecy over all the pertinent facts," 329
U.S. at 506, which a corporation could enjoy if a broad privilege were upheld.
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"clients" and their statements were not privileged.4
Upjohn won a battle when the Magistrate found the interviews
to be attorney work-product, but lost the war when he found it had
been overcome by a showing of sufficient need. He held the stan-
dard of need to be less onerous than that governing civil litigation
because of the public policies favoring vigorous and swift enforce-
ment of the revenue laws at the administrative level.49 The Gov-
ernment had met that standard by proving that (1) Upjohn had
refused to allow its employees to be interviewed about topics
Upjohn did not consider pertinent to the IRS' investigation, effec-
tively thwarting a full inquiry, (2) some interviewees, located in
foreign countries, were not subject to compulsory process, and (3)
even if available, the witness would likely show hesitancy or hostil-
ity because the interrogator was employed by the IRS. The Magis-
trate recommended full enforcement of the summons, and on April
29, 1978, Chief Judge Noel Fox adopted the Magistrate's recom-
mendation and ordered compliance.50
48. However, the privilege promotes the rendition of legal, not business, advice, and has
never protected business or financial advice given by a lawyer. United States v. Vehicular
Parking Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Del. 1943). See generally Simon, supra note 24, at
947 n.65.
For example, ordinary business documents (closing statements, real estate sales con-
tracts, etc.) which a client intends to divulge to third parties in the ordinary course of busi-
ness are not privileged. United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1963). The
same is true for other documents intended to be disclosed outside the two-way stream of
attorney-client communications. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir.
1963) (privilege for net worth statements but not for checks); United States v. Bank of
California, 424 F. Supp. 220, 225-27 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (client intends a check he writes to be
seen by strangers); Kellog v. Simon, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,882 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (no privilege
as to fact that lawyer drew deed); 8 WlGMorE, EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 2311 ("The reason
for prohibiting disclosure ... ceases when the client does not appear to have been desirous
of secrecy.").
49. Today, courts nearly universally recognize that there is no such thing as purely legal
or purely business advice, and in practice the requirement that legal advice be sought has
been liberally interpreted. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.
Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) (a lawyer's role includes the "whole orbit of legal functions");
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). But
see Diversified Industries Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600-03 (8th Cir. 1977). See also 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 13, §§ 2294, 2300; Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978); Note, 31 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1978).
50. The Magistrate issued his Report and Recommendation on February 23, 1978. Ear-
lier that month, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1978). Upjohn requested leave to file an additional brief,
which was granted. On March 7, 1978, in a letter-amendment to the Report and Recommen-
dation, the Magistrate noted the decision of the Eighth Circuit and stated that he was un-
1981] UPJOHN 25
The Court of Appeals sustained the District Court's holding
that the control group test measured the proper limits of the attor-
ney-client privilege,51 affirmed the decision in other respects,52 but
reversed and remanded for a determination of which interviewees
qualified as members of Upjohn's control group.5 3 In a cryptic foot-
note, ' the court held that the work-product doctrine simply did
not apply as a defense to an IRS summons.55 The Sixth'Circuit
persuaded, since the modified subject matter test adopted there was subject to the same
infirmities as the original version. Upjohn promptly moved for reconsideration, which the
Magistrate denied by a letter-ruling of March 13, 1978. Chief Judge Fox also considered
Diversified, but ordered enforcement on the strength of the Magistrate's ruling, on April 29,
1978. United States v. Upjohn, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,152 (W.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d
1223 (1979).
The Government did not oppose a stay pending appeal. Nor did the United States op-
pose the petition for a writ of certiorari. Had it done so and been successful, the issue might
have been mooted. United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). Compare United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (3d
Cir. 1976) with United States v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 616 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied sub nom. Levey v. United States, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
51. United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
52. Id. at 1228 n.13.
53. The reversal was not clearly required. As the party claiming the privilege, Upjohn
bore the burden of proving which employees should be included in the control group. Even
if its theory was that the subject matter test was the law, it was still obligated to show that
its interviewees were members of the control group if that test were to be adopted. Thus, its
failure to do so could have been viewed simply as a failure of proof by the party with the
burden, requiring no remand.
54. 600 F.2d at 1228 n.13.
55. The court held in part:
Upjohn's other arguments that the work-product doctrine and principles of
relevancy shield it from disclosure are not well founded. The work-product doc-
trine of Hickman v. Taylor, supra note 7, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) is not
applicable to administrative summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. The IRS
simply must show that the inquiry is relevant to a good faith investigation con-
ducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the information sought is not in
the IRS' possession and that proper administrative procedures have been
followed.
Id. at 1228 n.13 (citations omitted).
If the court's holding is that proof of the applicability of the work-product protection in
a particular case is not part of the settled, well-known, four-part prima facie case announced
in Powell which the government must show to obtain enforcement, the court's statement is
correct as a matter of summons law. However, the footnote entirely misses the point that
the work-product doctrine is a matter of a defense to a summons (like improper purpose,
attorney-client privilege, Fifth Amendment privilege, etc.) and has nothing to do with the
government's prima facie case for enforcement. In this sense, the court's holding that the
work-product protection is not available is a nonsequitur. Fortunately for the government,
the effect of this brief holding was to frame the issue of whether the work-product doctrine
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decision in Upjohn followed three other appellate decisions which
helped to frame the dimensions of the debate. All three involved
internal corporate "slush fund" investigations, and two were
prompted by the issuance of grand jury subpoenas.
The Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun
Company, Inc.),5 dealt with the validity of a federal grand jury
subpoena to Sun Company, Inc. (Sun) for documents, including
the results of questionnaires and lawyer-generated interview notes.
Both allegedly contained a litany of Sun's questionable payments
in connection with its foreign operations. An "Audit Committee"
of the Board of Directors had supervised the inquiry, and Sun's
vice-president and general counsel had retained a law firm to ad-
vise Sun about its legal obligations flowing from the payments and
from the filing of an 8-K Report with the SEC.57 Sun resisted the
is a defense to a summons, and not whether proof of its inapplicability is part of the govern-
ment's enforcement case. The parties had indeed so framed the issue. Brief for Petitioners,
at i, 44-63.
56. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
57. The formulation of these investigations was accomplished by a resolution of the
Board of Directors of Sun Company, Inc. The resolution adopted by Diversified Industries,
Inc., is typical of such resolutions:
RESOLVED, that, as this Board of Directors deems it to be in the best interests
of this Corporation and its stockholders, the General Counsel of the Corporation
be and he hereby is authorized, in behalf of this Board of Directors, to engage
the services of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. to conduct an in-
vestigation and inquiry into the matters disclosed and discussed in this regard at
this meeting for the purposes of eliciting facts, making certain findings, and pro-
viding to the Board of Directors of this Corporation a report possibly containing
recommendations as to course of action, so that the Board of Directors of this
Corporation may properly discharge its duties, and, further RESOLVED, that
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering be and they hereby are authorized to procure assis-
tance as may be reasonably required, in the above-designated inquiry, from ac-
counting firms and others to conclude in a prompt and diligent manner the
above commissioned inquiry and investigation, and, further RESOLVED, that
this Board of Directors hereby delegates to the Audit Committee of this Board
the power and authority to review this matter in detail with Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering and, where necessary and appropriate, to provide to that firm any nec-
essary interim authorizations or advice as may be necessary or desirable for the
efficient handling and conclusion of the above mentioned inquiry and investiga-
tion, and, further RESOLVED, that the officers and directors of this Corpora-
tion be and they hereby are directed to cooperate fully, and to ensure that all
employees of this Corporation cooperate fully with Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
and such other persons as Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering may retain in the fore-
going matters.
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (quoting
Resolution of Board of Directors of Diversified Industries, Inc.).
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subpoena by invoking the attorney-client privilege and work-prod-
uct doctrine. The Court of Appeals rejected the first defense but
sustained the second. The attorney-client privilege defense failed
because the court adopted the control group test and Sun had con-
ceded that the interviewees were not members of Sun's control
group.5s
The court sustained the work-product defense59 because the
Government had made no effort to subpoena the Sun interviewees
(whose identities were known) before the grand jury and therefore
could not show, as one element of substantial need, that they
would be unavailable or unwilling to testify. The court rejected the
Government's second allegation of need, Sun's alleged coverup of
its payments practices, as unsupported. The third, the need to test
the interviewees' credibility once they were subpoenaed before the
grand jury, caused the court to distinguish between the interview
notes and questionnaire results. The interview notes demanded a
higher degree of protection since they were inevitably the product.
of an attorney's mental sifting and arranging of the facts.ee Ques-
tionnaire results were less the product of an attorney's thought
58. 599 F.2d at 1233-37.
59. The court was required to confront several preliminary hurdles before passing on
the Government's claim of need. One was its ruling that the data was generated in antici-
pation of litigation, 599 F.2d at 1229. The factors in this ruling were that the investigation
concerned suspected criminal violations, some evidence of which had already been uncov-
ered when the law firm entered the case. Some litigation was "almost inevitable" if other
illicit payments were revealed. Id. Finally, the prospect of litigation was intensified because
Sun was legally obligated to disclose its activities to shareholders and government agencies.
This requirement poses some potentially difficult issues. For example, when does an attor-
ney anticipate litigation? Whose anticipation counts? Does the answer depend on whether
the client or attorney actually engaged in litigation, or whether the objective factors showed
a reasonable prospect of litigation? See Miller, infra note 128. In practice, however, courts
are not usually disposed to deny a reasonably well-supported "anticipation" claim. The
Third and other circuits have taken a relatively liberal view of the anticipation of litigation
requirement. Sun Company, 599 F.2d 1224; Kent Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd.,
530 F.2d 612, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (work-product doc-
trine does not depend on litigation taking place, but rather on actual possibility of litiga-"
tion); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970), afl'd by
an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (per curiam), reh. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971)
(memoranda of attorney is work-product though attorney functioned as investigator). Al-
though the Eighth Circuit's en banc ruling in Diversified Industries, Inc., left intact the
three-judge panel's earlier decision that the Diversified investigation was not carried out in
anticipation of litigation, it was technically unnecessary for the full court to disturb (or
reach) that point, since it reversed on the privilege issue. 572 F.2d at 610-11.
60. For that reason the court held that they would never be discoverable if the only
suggestion of need was to test a witness' credibility.
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power or an attorney's work and therefore required correspond-
igly less protection. The court ruled that here the Government
might be entitled to the questionnaire results, even if testing credi-
bility were the only justification, but not where it had made no
effort to subpoena the witnesses.6 1 Thus the court affirmed the
quashing of the grand jury subpoena.
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith2 presented the ques-
tionable payments issue in the context of private litigation, specifi-
cally the alleged bribery of a Diversified competitor's salesmen.
The Securities and Exchange Commission had investigated the
charge; the result had been a suit for an injunction and a consent
decree. Alerted by the SEC probe, Diversified's Board of Directors
instituted an investigation by its outside counsel which resulted in
a report to the Board.
The appellate panel which first heard the case recognized the
split of authority on the issue of the identity of the client, but
found it unnecessary to take sides. It found that outside counsel
had not been hired to provide legal services or advice, but merely
to investigate the facts and make business recommendations as to
Diversified's future conduct.63 Moreover, the panel held that the
law firm did not generate work in anticipation of litigation; there-
fore, the work-product doctrine did not apply.
The court, sitting en banc, reversed, holding the lawyer-gener-
61. Why the questionnaires should be entitled to less protection is not clear. There is
authority to the effect that questionnaire forms, when shown to be the result of a lawyer's
thinking and analysis, would certainly be entitled to work-product protection. Cornaglia v.
Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1974). An interview, particularly one which follows
up a questionnaire (as in Sun Company, Upjohn and the other questionable payments
cases), is the product of relatively more spontaneous thought by the lawyer. To be sure, the
lawyer who prepared well for an interview will undoubtedly have a list of questions in hand,
but by its nature an interview contemplates a give-and-take, which is spontaneous (or at
least more spontaneous than a questionnaire). Accordingly, not only may a questionnaire be
work-product, but it also may be more the fruit of careful legal analysis-more the work-
product--of a lawyer than its interview counterpart. One possible explanation for the
court's opposite ruling is that Sun may have failed to prove the work-product nature of the
interviews. Another is that the questionnaire may have been composed by non-lawyers, that
is, by accountants or the Audit Committee itself. If so, the court does not so state.
62, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd en banc, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
63. "The work that Law Firm was employed to perform could have been performed just
as readily by non-lawyers aided to the extent necessary by a firm of public accountants."
572 F.2d at 603. The court further noted that the interviewees had been requested to be
fully cooperative and to surrender to the lawyers all requested records.
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ated data to be privileged under a modified subject matter test." It
discarded the control group test; in the court's view, that test
failed to account for "the realities of corporate life; '6 5 specifically,
it did not recognize that any large corporation must glean legally
significant factual data from middle management and non-man-
agement employees. The investigating lawyer faced an intolerable
dilemma under the control group test: his interviews of the knowl-
edgeable non-management employees would not be privileged; his
failure to interview them because of the lack of privilege would re-
sult in incomplete data. The court therefore thought the control
group test inhibited the free flow of information to a legal advisor,
defeating the purpose of the privilege, and discouraged communi-
cations made in a good faith effort to promote compliance with the
complex laws governing corporate activity.
On the other hand, the court acknowledged the strong likeli-
hood that the subject matter test would result in shielding damag-
ing data from discovery by channelling communications through
attorneys. Accordingly, it modified the subject matter test by ad-
ding the requirements that (1) the communication be made for the
purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employer's superior make
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; and
(3) the communication not be dissemminated beyond those per-
sons who, because of the corporate structure, needed to know its
contents.6" The court believed that this version would properly
open to discovery most routine intra-corporate reports and the
statements of fortuitous witnesses. Finding that Diversified had
met all requirements of the modified test, the court held the re-
ports to be privileged.
Finally, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated December 19,
1978,67 a federal grand jury issued a subpoena to the general coun-
64. 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978). The modifications were those suggested by Judge Jack
B. Weinstein, 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIENCE § 503(b) [04] (1975) [hereinafter cited
as WEINSTEN].
65. 572 F.2d at 608.
66. The first two of these extra ingredients appear to be identical. In addition, they
appear to add nothing to the formula which was not already present in Judge Wysanski's
decision in United States v. United Shoe Machinery; to be privileged, every communication
must be generated for the purpose of securing legal advice. Judge Weinstein's third element
is somewhat difficult to apply. It is a quasi-confidentiality requirement, but appears based
on business need rather than legal need. If so, it would be contrary to the classical formula-
tion of the privilege, which protects only communications made to secure legal advice.
67. 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979).
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sel of John Doe, Inc.,68 demanding production of five categories of
documents, including the results of an investigation that John
Doe's outside law firm had conducted into the corporation's illicit
foreign payments practices. Hoping to take advantage of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission's Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram and thereby avert securities litigation, the corporation had
filed an 8-K report and divulged additional details in later meet-
ings with SEC representatives. 9 Later, it filed a second 8-K report.
Shareholders also filed a derivative suit, and the Internal Revenue
Service's Intelligence Division began an investigation. That probe
ripened into a grand jury investigation which resulted in the con-
tested subpoena.
The Court of Appeals denied the attorney-client privilege to
the results of the initial investigation that John Doe's management
had conducted, but sustained the claim of work product as to the
law firm's subsequent investigation. In the court's view, prospects
of amended corporate tax returns and civil and/or criminal liability
had prompted the second investigation; the corporation had under-
taken the investigation for the purpose of securing legal advice.
The interviewing lawyers took notes and made memoranda from
them; these were prima facie subject to the work-product shield.
Unlike the Third Circuit in Sun Company, the Second Circuit did
not distinguish between questionnaire results and interview notes
in terms of the degree of "need" required to overcome the protec-
tion; it held that the government's asserted "need" to identify po-
tentially immunizable witnesses was insufficient.
The Supreme Court has resolved the split among the circuits
by firmly rejecting thi control group test. In the Supreme Court's
view, that test failed to grasp that modern corporations are com-
pelled to investigate themselves (usually through lawyers) from
time to time to assure compliance with a myriad of laws, and that
mid-level employees often possess data pertinent to such investiga-
tions. Moreover, corporations "constantly" go to lawyers to find
68. All parties requested that the identity of the corporation and the individuals
involved not be disclosed. 599 F.2d at 506 n.1.
69. The fact pattern was typical: independent auditors notified management of pay-
ments. Management conducted preliminary investigation. Lawyers followed with later
inquiry. "Employees of the company were instructed to cooperate fully and to disclose
whatever knowledge each had of questionable payments while in the company's employ."
599 F.2d at 507.
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out how to obey the law. Noting that the life of the privilege de-
pends upon full freedom to disclose facts, the Court believed the
control group test would frustrate the purpose of the privilege by
discouraging employees from communicating relevant information.
The result is likely to be inferior legal advice and a diminished
opportunity for corporate counsel to ensure the corporation's com-
pliance with the complicated array of regulatory legislation con-
fronting the modern corporation. Moreover, the control group test
was difficult to apply in practice because of the shifting identities
of the control group members. Where the communications con-
cerning questionable payments were made by corporate employees
to corporate counsel, so that counsel could give legal advice, the
Court was not prepared to deny the privilege. After all, that privi-
lege protects not only legal advice but the communication of
underlying facts as well.
The Court not only held the work-product doctrine applicable
as a defense to an IRS summons (i.e., at the administrative stage
of an agency investigation), but also found that the Government's
proof that Upjohn had blocked access to employees and had for-
bidden others to testify about matters the company considered ir-
relevant was insufficient to overcome that protection. It strongly
suggested that no quantum of proof could ever pierce the work-
product shield with respect to lawyers' notes of oral interviews.
With respect to other work product, a far greater showing of need
than that adduced by the Government was required. Since the
quantum of such need was uncertain, and since the Court was re-
luctant to lay down a rule, it remanded this portion of the decision.
Prior to Upjohn, the Supreme Court had often viewed broad
assertions of privilege and expansive allegations of rights of privacy
with skepticism. It had all but eliminated the spousal privilege,70
narrowly construed the Fifth Amendment privilege in a summons
case involving a criminal tax investigation,7 1 declared that there
was no federal accountant-client privilege, nor any justification for
one,72 and even strictly interpreted the attorney-client privilege.78
The Court had refused to review many other decisions in which
70. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
71. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973).
72. 409 U.S. 322, 335.
73. 425 U.S. 391.
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privileges of one variety or another had been interposed as de-
fenses to IRS criminal tax investigative efforts. 7' In Trammel v.
United States,75 the Court had declared what has usually been
understood to be the guiding credo in the interpretation of privi-
lege claims:
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamen-
tal principle that "the public ... has a right to every man's evidence."
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). As such, they must be
strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permit-
ting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good tran-
scending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means
for ascertaining truth." . . . Accord, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
709-710 (1974).7 6
In Fisher v. United States, in language fully consistent with its
denial of privilege, the Court noted the settled principle that
"since the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant informa-
tion from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve
its purpose. Accordingly, it protects only those disclosures - nec-
essary to obtain informed legal advice - which might not have
been made absent the privilege. '77
Yet in Upjohn, the Court, citing Fisher itself, where the privi-
lege had been so recently confined, declared that the attorney-cli-
ent privilege "has long been recognized" and founded in neces-
sity.78 It cited Trammel for the principle that the attorney-client
privilege protects not only the giving of professional advice, but
also the underlying information used to formulate that advice.
However, in Trammel, the Court took pains to confine the spousal
privilege, which it deemed to be more expansive than other privi-
leges such as the attorney-client or physician-patient privilege.
The courts which had denied claims of privilege had usually
done so based upon two governing standards: (1) privileges are not
74. United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979), arguably involving conflict with United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. First Nat'l St. Bank of N.J., 616 F.2d 668, involving inter-
pretation of United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
75. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
76. Id. at 50-51.
77. 425 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). In Fisher, the Court denied the privilege as to
documents surrendered to an attorney which would not have been protected in the hands of
the client. The Court has rarely favored evidentiary privileges. See Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40; Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
78. 449 U.S. at 389.
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favored in the law because they hide the truth, and, therefore, (2)
the courts should construe any assertion of privilege within the
narrowest permissible limits consistent with the purposes of the
privilege.7 9 In Upjohn, these settled principles have been shaken. 0
The Court appears to have accepted, mostly uncritically, all argu-
ments advanced by the corporate petitioner, and to have brushed
aside most of the arguments presented by the Government. For
example, the Court accepted Upjohn's assertion that because the
control group test created a "Hobson's choice" for corporate coun-
sel, it therefore frustrated the purpose of the privilege by discour-
aging communication of facts. This conclusion does not necessarily
follow from the premise and appears to be contradicted by the
work-product section of the opinion. Moreover, the reverse may be
closer to the truth; even if a Hobson's choice exists, other sources
may generate sufficient compulsion to ensure that communications
still take place.8 1 The Court criticized the control group test as be-
ing difficult to apply and unpredictable, requiring case-by-case
analysis. Nowhere does the decision elucidate why that feature is a
79. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNAUGHTON rev. ed. 1961). See also United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974). The protection afforded by this privilege is quite
narrow. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357. This grudging
attitude has resulted in quite narrow constructions of the several elements of the privilege.
For example, every element must be proved, and the burden is on the proponent of the
privilege. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 346 (M.D. Pa. 1972). The identity of the client, fee data and the
general nature of services performed are not privileged. United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d
248, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1975) (identity of clients); United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101
(9th Cir. 1973) (fee data); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d at 638 (fee data, general ser-
vices). But see Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1960). Legal, not accounting,
business, or financial advice must be sought. 360 F. Supp. at 346-47; United States v.
Heiberger, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,940 (D. Conn. 1976). Documents and data which pre-date
the establishment of the relationship are not privileged. United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d
174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967) (appraisal report); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 453,
456-57 (8th Cir. 1963) (accountant's work papers); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d at 639;
United States v. Player, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,988 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (client's business
records); United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 928 (E.D. Ky. 1962) (client's own
records delivered to attorney). Records which are required by law to be maintained are not
privileged. United States v. Shapiro, 335 U.S. 1, 32-36 (1948); United States v. Peden, 70-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 84,152 (W.D. Ky. 1970). Public or quasi-public documents cannot be privi-
leged. Kelley v. Simon, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,882 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (deed). Of course, the
presence of an attorney, or the transfer to an attorney of records, will not create a privilege
where none had existed. 316 F.2d at 457; United States v. Falsone, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th
Cir. 1953).
80. See Brief for Appellees at 18-20.
81. See Sec. II infra.
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drawback, or why a certain degree of individual treatment, even
considering the attendant difficulties in each case, should logically
compel or contribute to the adoption of a contrary across-the-
board rule. Simplicity alone should not control what standard is
adopted. Indeed, the control group test's requirement of case-by-
case analysis-a method endorsed in Upjohn itself 82-may well be
more faithful to the tenets underlying the attorney-client privilege.
The Court did address, in a footnote,8 the Government's sug-
gestion that even under the control group test, the corporation
would still feel a compulsion to seek legal advice. It assumed the
truth of this suggestion, but rejected its implications by concluding
that the "depth and quality"'" of that advice would suffer. The
Court's reasoning failed to address its own prior statements that
the privilege rule should be fashioned narrowly,85 and failed to ad-
duce any evidence for its conclusion that internal investigations
would suffer from a strict interpretation of the privilege.
The Court also rejected the Government's "zone of silence"
argument-that a broad rule of privilege will encourage creation of
a wide zone of undiscoverable matter-by stating that such a rule
places the Government in no worse position than if the communi-
cations had never taken place. The underlying "facts" are still
available. However, this conclusion is not responsive to the privi-
lege issue presented and appears to disregard the reality of an IRS
investigation which takes place years after the events involved. In
a fraud investigation, the central issue may be "what did the cor-
poration know and when did it know it?" The Court's "no worse
position" language somewhat cavalierly sanctions the shielding of
potentially highly probative, and often unique, evidence on these
issues.
Finally, the Court invoked Ethical Canon 4-1 of the American
Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility to bolster its
view of the necessity for lawyer fact-gathering. In doing so, the
Court may have been seeking to elevate its rejection of the control
group test to the status of an ethical imperative. However, the eth-
ical rules, read against Upjohn's endorsement of the subject mat-
ter test, create intolerable ethical dilemmas that the control group
82. 449 U.S. at 386, 396-97.
83. Id. at 393 n.2.
84. Id.
85. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 79).
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test does not."
These problems and inconsistencies carry forward to the
Court's statements on the work-product doctrine. These will be
discussed below. 7 The other conspicuous departure of the decision
is its tone. For at least the last seventy years, contrary to its rul-
ings on individuals' rights in the non-tax area, the Court had held
the view that corporations involved in regulatory and tax disputes
with agencies were by their nature subject to the "broad visitorial
power" of the state.8  For example, it had sustained a Federal
Trade Commission subpoena which required a corporation to cre-
ate highly detailed and particularized reports to demonstrate com-
pliance with a cease and desist order.8 9
More recently, the Court had been hostile toward expansive
readings of alleged rights of privacy, including such allegations in
IRS and other criminal investigations." In Couch v. United
States,9 1 the Court concluded its opinion with the words: "[iut is
important, in applying constitutional principles, to interpret them
in light of the fundamental interests of personal liberty they were
meant to serve. Respect for these principles is eroded when they
leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest of
society in enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenue.'*
The tone of Upjohn reversed this pattern and is perhaps best
characterized in a portion of the decision itself:
[The narrow control group test] not only makes it difficult for corporate at-
torneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific
legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate
counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law....
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel
for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to
86. See Sec. IV infra.
87. See Sec. V infra.
88. Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946).
89. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
90. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979); United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); United States v. New
York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (de-
positor has no Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights in bank records); California Bankers As-
sociation v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (Bank Secrecy Act upheld over Fourth Amendment
challenge; Act requires disclosure of certain checks to IRS); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973) (no accountant-client privilege).
91. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
92. Id. at 336.
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secure legal advice for counsel.... Information, not available from upper-
echelon management, was needed to supply a basis for legal advice concern-
ing compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regula-
tions, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas.
The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees'
corporate duties.... The policy statement was issued "in order that there be
no uncertainty in the future as to the policy with respect to the practices
which are the subject of this investigation." It began "Upjohn will comply
with all laws and regulations," and stated that commissions or payments "will
not be used as a subterfuge for bribes or illegal payments" and that all pay-
ments must be "proper and legal.". . . Pursuant to explicit instructions from
the Chairman of the Board, the communications were considered "highly
confidential" when made ... and have been kept confidential by the c~m-
pany. Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privi-
lege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclosure."
The Court's dramatically altered stance may reflect the follow-
ing nonlegal factors: (1) society today is considerably more friendly
to the exercise of corporate prerogatives than at earlier times, and
(2) the lawyers' own privilege for their more important clients was
at stake.
In short, the Upjohn company-now perhaps perceived to be a
representative of an unfairly maligned group-was just trying to
clean house. To such a sympathetic litigant the Supreme Court
was not prepared to deny a privilege which, by its lights, was nec-
essary to insure that the sanitizing would continue.
Upjohn thus leaves the distinct impression that the Court
knew the result it wanted to reach and proceeded to construct a
one-sided syllogism to get there." A more critical and thorough
analysis of the issues and arguments involved might have led to a
different conclusion. That analysis is contained in the following
Section (II).
Moreover, as Part IV shows, the Court's broad language may
liberalize the application of other sub-doctrines which form the
rules for the attorney-client privilege. The application of Upjohn
to those sub-doctrines, as well as the specific rules laid down in the
decision, may compel some measure of retreat as later cases begin
to demonstrate hidden dangers in the Upjohn ruling.
93. 449 U.S. 392, 394-95.
94. One writer has stated: "In these times of increasing demand for regulatory reform,
the Court's decision is most assuredly consistent with the latest election returns." Pitt, The
Upjohn Decision, Legal Times of Washington, Jan. 26, 1981, at 20, col. 1.
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II. ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
Prior to Upjohn, the Third, Sixth and Tenth Circuits had
adopted the control group test; the Seventh and Eighth, the sub-
ject matter test."5 This nearly even split demonstrates the difficul-
ties of the choice and the respectability of arguments on both
sides.
The case law98 may be distilled into the following list of argu-
ments respecting each test.
95. For a definition of the subject matter test, see note 8 supra. Besides the two present
tests, some writers have suggested yet a third approach to the problem-a balancing test
which would be applied in the context of each piece of litigation in which the privilege is
asserted. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitu-
tional Entitlement, 91 HAnv. L. Rav. 464 (1977); Herzel & Hagan, Do Corporations Really
Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?, 59 Cm. BAR. REc. 296 (1978). But see Note, The Attor-
ney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REv. 424
(1970); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 69 MICH. L. RIv. 360 (1970). The balancing approach was given perhaps its first
judicial approval in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), which held that
the attorney-client privilege was an available corporate defense to discovery in a shareholder
derivative suit, but that it was subject to the right of the shareholders to show why it should
not be invoked in the particular case, depending on a number of factors. Those factors in-
cluded: the number of shareholders and the percentage of outstanding stock they owned, the
bona fides of the shareholder, the nature of the claim and whether it was colorable, the
availability of the information from alternative sources, whether the corporate wrongdoing
was also potentially criminal, vhether the communication related to past or prospective ac-
tions, whether the communication regarded the litigation itself, whether the communication
sought was specifically identified, and the risk of revealing trade secrets.
The Garner approach, or any balancing approach, presents numerous problems. It effec-
tively means that the privilege can be pierced by a showing of good cause (like the work-
product doctrine) and that it therefore ceases to be a true privilege. In one sense, of course,
the present formulation of the privilege is itself the product of balancing numerous factors.
But it is one thing to balance generally in arriving-over many years--at a fixed formula,
easily applied to particular cases or to guide conduct; most rules of law do that much. It is
quite another to balance on a case-by-case basis. A balancing approach would likely make
corporate legal life disastrously uncertain. It is likely that corporations' insatiable need for
legal advice would have the effect of maintaining the flow of communications, but this cir-
cumstance does not argue in favor of a balancing approach any more than any other ap-
proach. The salient point is that under either the subject matter test or control group test of
"client," a relatively fixed set of rules would exist to guide the profession and its clients.
Under a balancing approach, it would likely be impossible to predict with any confidence
whether particular communications would be privileged. It is therefore difficult to perceive
how a balancing approach could be justified.
96. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Company), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Diver-
sified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Harper & Row Publishers v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
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Subject Matter Test
Pro
1. Encourages intra-corporate communication. 7
2. Encourages self-policing by corporations."8
3. Limits the availability of the privilege by denying it to corporate
bystander witnesses. 99
Con
1. Creates a broad "zone of silence" subject to easy abuse.100
2. Funnels sensitive information through corporate counsel, ham-
pering discovery.101
3. Encourages senior managers to ignore important information.0 2
4. Operates to hide the truth.0 3
Control Group Test
Pro
1. Limits the availability of the privilege to those who are true cor-
porate decision makers. 04
2. Guards against limitations on discovery of evidence. 10 5
3. Provides sufficient protection combined with the attorney work-
product defense to foster self-policing.1°0
4. Draws a bright, easily comprehended line demarcating the
boundaries of the privilege.0 7
Con
1. Inhibits intra-corporate communication by presenting a Hob-
97. Contra, Sun Company, 599 F.2d at 1236-37; Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609.
98. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609.
99. Cf. Harper & Row Publishers, 423 F.2d 487, 491; Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at
609.
100. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227. Cf. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609.
101. 600 F.2d at 1227; 572 F.2d at 609.
102. 600 F.2d at 1227.
103. See Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227; Sun Company, 599 F.2d at 1235.
104. Sun Company, 599 F.2d at 1236.
105. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227.
106. Id. Sun Company, 599 F.2d at 1235-37.
107. Sun Company, 569 F.2d at 1235.
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son's choice.108
2. Discourages self-policing by corporations. 109
A. The Subject Matter Test-Positive Considerations
1. Encourages intra-corporate communication. The major jus-
tification for the subject matter test is that it permits or encour-
ages a freer flow of information between upper, middle and lower
management levels of the corporation. Without this broad test,
communication of factual data or legal advice would be severely
crippled or rendered ineffective altogether.110
To test this proposition, one must first ask whether it is logi-
cally consistent with the policies underlying the privilege and, sec-
ond, from a behavioral perspective, whether an expansive concep-
tion of "client" in fact promotes the policies of the privilege.
The first perspective may be summarized as follows: (1) the
attorney-client privilege exists to foster full disclosure between
lawyer and client so that our adversary system may work. (2) The
subject matter test of "client" promotes freer communication than
the control group test. (3) Therefore, that test should be the defini-
tion of client. However, any formulation of privilege wider in scope
than, for example, one which would protect only the chairman of
the board, may be said to encourage the loquacity of those within
it. A privilege which includes the control group is broader than one
confined to the board chairman. A privilege which protects cus-
tomers or agents of the corporation would encourage a freer flow of
data than even the subject matter test. A test which encourages
freer disclosure than the next narrower test does not, by that fact,
compel the conclusion that such a test ought to define the limits of
"client." If the privilege is to be confined within the narrowest lim-
its consistent with the logic of its principle, the proper inquiry is:
108. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 509. This choice is essentially one between the
need to obtain information from middle management versus the prospect of disclosure in
the context of litigation.
109. Id.
110. Sun Company, 599 F.2d at 1236; Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609. "The
privilege is now seen to rest on the theory that encouraging clients to make the fullest dis-
closure to their attorneys enables the latter to act more effectively, justly and expeditiously,
and that these benefits outweigh the risks posed by barring full revelation in court." 2
WEINSTEIN, supra note 64, 503[02]. This rationale was the linchpin of the Upjohn decision
in the Supreme Court. The Court's rejection of the control group test, and its adoption, in
effect, of the subject matter test, was dependent on the validity of this premise alone.
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How much of a shield is necessary-at a bare minimum-to ac-
complish the job of effectively guiding corporate legal decision-
making?111 This is a question the Supreme Court did not address
in Upjohn.
A second aspect of the logic of the privilege focuses on its in-
tended beneficiaries. One must ask: For whom is the privilege in-
tended? In questionable payments cases, the major (in Upjohn,
the only) consumer of intra-corporate legal advice is clearly top
management. Management initiates the factual and legal inquiry;
it seeks counsel and determines the legal steps the corporation will
take as a result of the lawyers' investigation. Employees-fact
sources-would not ordinarily believe they are seeking personal
legal advice when the chairman of the board orders them to bare
their souls to the investigating lawyer. They will normally have no
part in deciding what action the corporation will take on the law-
yers' advice. They do not seek, desire, benefit by, nor formulate,
the legal advice the lawyer eventually gives; yet the subject matter
test would grant (and the Supreme Court has granted) privileged
status to their communications. Thus the subject matter test ap-
pears at odds with a basic element of the privilege, that legal ad-
vice be sought by the same client"1 2 who communicates facts to his
111. The inquiry should be framed this way because of the settled law that "since the
privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies
only where necessary to achieve its purpose." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976). Therefore, the privilege should protect only those communications which would not
have been made absent the privilege. The courts should confine the privilege strictly "within
the narrowest limits consistent with the logic of its principle." In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,
81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2292 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961)); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980). The practi-
cal result of judicial hostility to the privilege is that the asserter not only bears the burden
of proof to demonstrate its applicability, but also carries the burden with respect to each
element of privilege and each datum of contested material. A blanket claim of privilege
should be rejected. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981); Matter
of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d
1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974) (asserter must normally raise the privilege as to each record
sought so the court can rule with specificity).
112. As originally proposed, the Federal Rules of Evidence took a position very much in
line with this reasoning. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969). Proposed Rule 5-
03(a)(1) defined "client" as a "person, public officer, or corporation . . . who is rendered
professional legal services by a lawyer or who consults a lawyer . . . ." Id. at 249-50. Pro-
posed Rule 5-03(a)(3) defined "representative of a client" as "one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the
client." Id. at 250. Strong opposition developed in the non-government bar to this apparent
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lawyer.
The subject matter test therefore hinges on the availability of
the attorney-client privilege on the gratuitous fact of employment.
Let us suppose that a corporation engages in an illegal practice
-for example, payment of a bribe to a foreign government official
to secure a contract. If the actual payor is an employee, the subject
matter test would shield his communications to the corporation's
lawyers about the bribe. If, however, the payor is a mere agent (i.e.,
an independent contractor), the privilege would not obtain. In both
examples, however, the corporation's desire to investigate, its need
for the information, its investigators, and its sources of facts, are
identical. The same desirability exists to encourage corporate fact-
gathering; yet the employee's communications would be privileged
and the independent agent's would not. Non-control group person-
nel are thus, at bottom, mere fact witnesses, and therefore can not
personify the corporation.
Indeed, the foci of the two tests are entirely different. The
control group test focuses on the people, and their powers, who
can commit the corporation to action based on legal advice. It
answers the question: For whom should the privilege exist? Who
needs it and asks for it? Who, in all the corporate universe, should
enjoy it? For what purpose? In short, who is to be protected? By
contrast, the subject matter test focuses almost exclusively on acts
about which communications are made. It answers the questions:
What acts of employees should be protected? Is the subject matter
one which concerns the duties of employment? In short, what is to
be protected?
Seen in this light, the subject matter test departs from the
traditional concept of the attorney-client privilege. After all, the
privilege traditionally protects clients, not actions or subject mat-
ters. By contrast, the control group test adheres more closely to
the line of inquiry suggested in the several elements of the privi-
lege itself.
The second aspect of the "freer communications" argument is
the suggestion that, as a matter of predictable behavior, employees
will be less likely to show candor, (and managers less likely to de-
adoption of the control group test, and, due to this and the troublesome aspects of other
portions of the rule, the entire idea of an enumerated set of privileges was abandoned, leav-
ing Rule 501. See generally 2 WEmNSTEN, supra note 64, 503101].
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mand it) if the privilege is not extended to them by means of the
subject matter test. Although some writers have characterized this
proposition as untestable,113 the Upjohn Court accepted it without
question or support.114 Incomplete but suggestive empirical evi-
dence, and logic, permit inquiry into the likelihood of this
proposition.
The empirical evidence derives in part from the questionable
payments cases themselves. In each, the board chairman or other
executive officer sent a questionnaire to key employees, requesting
that they complete it in a spirit of total candor and cooperation.
The cases, as reported, do not show that the questionnaire or its
transmittal letter were privileged, but rather merely confidential.
Yet from all appearances the employees cooperated fully. Although
the conditions of the actual interviews are less clear, the cases do
not suggest the corporations and their lawyers made an outright
promise of confidentiality or privilege. It is likely that these inter-
views, conducted on the heels of the chairman's questionnaire, car-
ried forward the persuasive force of his authority. Again, the cases
demonstrate no apparent reluctance on the part of the employees
to speak truthfully.
Other empirical data appear to indicate that the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege is not widely known, or when
known, is not an overwhelmingly decisive factor in encouraging
candor. 11 5 For example, in one survey, 55 of the 108 laymen in the
sample stated that, without the privilege, they would make less
than full disclosure to the attorney. But a majority also believed
attorneys would maintain confidences of clients outside the court-
room, aside from considerations of privilege.118
A witness' reluctance or desire to speak freely may depend
greatly on the ground rules for the interview. For example, a cor-
poration's lawyer may give the following prefatory remarks to an
interviewee:
113. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test,
84 HmAv. L. REV. 424 (1970); 2 WEINSTEIN, supra note 64, 1 503[02].
114. In Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393, the Court states flatly that the "depth and quality of
the internal investigation will suffer" if a broad test is not adopted. Id. at n.2. This un-
supported proposition is beside the point if the issue was that minimum protection neces-
sary to ensure the continuation of such an investigation.
115. Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
Implication for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
116. Id. at 1262.
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We are here to interview you in an effort to determine the extent to which
our corporation has engaged in illegal or questionable payments. We have
identified you as one of the persons who may have been involved. Before we
begin, however, we must tell you that under the law, I am not your lawyer; I
am the corporation's. While what you say can be privileged, the corporation
may later have to disclose it, in whole or in part, voluntarily or by govern-
ment compulsion. If voluntary, the decision to disclose will not be yours, but
will be the company's. If what you say is incriminating to you, it will still be
disclosable because the corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege. Now,
let us begin.117
The lawyer prefacing the interview with such remarks should
expect less than total candor in return. It is, therefore, unlikely
that such an alienating (but probably appropriate) preface would
be given. More likely, the cases hint that the Chief Executive Of-
ficer politely but firmly asks for total candor and cooperation. The
employee then fills out the questionnaire in a spirit of complete
fealty. Later, the lawyers request time to "follow up" the question-
naire or "verify" the responses with an interview. They may give
no extensive explanation of the purposes of the interview, do not
suggest separate counsel for the employee, state nothing about the
attorney-client privilege, and perhaps little or nothing about the
confidentiality of his responses. The dominant impetus is, and re-
mains, the employee's loyalty to his corporation. The interviewee is
very likely to be a middle or upper-level manager with years' ten-
ure, pension rights, seniority and other accoutrements of a vested
career position. In contrast, the privilege is a theoretical and little-
used concept. The corporation is not likely in these circumstances
to restrict the interviewee's candor, and it is equally unlikely that
he would do so himself.
Thus the cases which speak of the control group test as disre-
garding "the realities of corporate life," themselves disregard the
reality. Employees will freely complete questionnaires and submit
to interviews, regardless of which test of "client" is adopted. In-
117. As this hypothetical preface suggests, the lawyer and his client may well be legal
antagonists, even if they do not articulate fully their sets of interests at the start of their
relationship. Since the company lawyer effectively substitutes for the SEC's investigator, the
entire investigative process takes on a "wolf-in-sheep's clothing" aspect. The lawyer in real-
ity will give no advice of constitutional rights, though the interviewee may well be about to
incriminate himself, and though the governmental investigator may have been so obliged or
instructed. The interviewee may wish (or need) his own counsel under these circumstances,
but the offer of separate counsel is conspicuously absent from the questionable payments
cases. The entire situation is fraught with ethical problems. See Sec. IV infra.
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deed, such appears to have been the case in Sun Company,11 8
where the corporation was subject to the control group standard, " °
and in the other cases where the governing test was unsettled.
2. Encourages self-policing by corporations. The Supreme
Court in Upjohn believed that the subject matter test would en-
courage corporations to ferret out unpleasant or even illegal behav-
ior, by diminishing the fear of compelled disclosure of the discov-
ered data. The only evidence on this hypothesis comes from the
cases themselves. The announcement of the control group test in
1962120 (applied to a grand jury subpoena issued in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania), appears not to have impeded Sun Com-
pany from conducting its investigation in the same district. Indeed,
during 1970-1976 when many internal investigations were con-
ducted,1 21 the subject matter test applied only in the Seventh Cir-
cuit. None of the reported questionable payments investigations
took place, nor were subpoenas or summonses issued in the states
in that Circuit; yet corporations elsewhere seem not to have been
discouraged by the uncertain availability of the privilege.
The questionable payments cases, including Upjohn, show
that, rather than privileges, potential exposure to securities and
tax law violations, derivative suits, charges of currency violations,
and other independent business reasons provided the impetus. For
example, in Upjohn, the company's briefs and testimony at trial122
118. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Company), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
119. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483. The Sun
Company decision itself does not specify where the interviews took place. However, Sun, its
law firm, and the grand jury were all located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
120. See note 7 supra.
121. The decisions indicate the investigations focused on the following time periods:
United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,598 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (1971-1975);
In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Company), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) (unspecified);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Inc.), 599 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1979) (1970-1975).
By the time the investigations commenced, the control group test had been widely adopted.
Nat.ta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Sun Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
122. Mr. Thomas testified as follows:
Q. Was that on your mind when you went to [outside counsel]?
A. SEC was one of the things, of course.
Q. What else was on your mind?
A. Tax problems, a possible problem in foreign countries, evasion of foreign laws,
possible currency restrictions-there were really a whole string of legal problems
that flow out of these-
Q. But the one that you had paramount in your mind was SEC when you went
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demonstrated its eagerness to take shelter under the SEC's Volun-
tary Disclosure Program.123 Upjohn may also have been concerned
about shareholder suits; indeed, the work-product defense de-
pended entirely on its ability to convince the Court that it con-
to see [outside counsel]?
A. No, I think the primary thing in my mind was the whole problem growing out
of a company doing these kind of things, and I continued to think of it in terms
of that kind of a problem.
Q. All right, but when you went to see [outside counsel], what suggestions were
there then of the SEC problem that were entailed by this discovery?
A. Well, I think in talking with him and his partners, and in view of the public-
ity about other companies, it appeared that in order of time SEC problem might
be first, because we obviously have an obligation to disclose to the SEC and our
stockholders anything that is important.
Q. The publicity in the newspapers and elsewhere and talk about other compa-
nies dealt with what aspect of the SEC and its program with respect to these
items?
A. The disclosure the companies were making to the SEC, and hence to the
public.
Q. And they were making them, were they not, under some sort of assurance or
suggestion from the SEC that if you came clean, while you wouldn't get immu-
nity, you might be well treated?
A. That's correct.
Q. So when you started this investigation, in a sense, and went to see [outside
counsel], it was with the understanding, was it not, that there was going to be a
disclosure to the SEC?
A. Oh, not at all. I had no idea at this time that the problem was great enough to
require an SEC disclosure.
Q. Well, you had enough of an inclination or enough of an indication to know
that if you ascertained a larger problem you were going to have to disclose it to
the SEC; didn't you know enough at that time to know it?
A. At that time I certainly did not know enough to know that an SEC disclosure
would be required. And I think to be quite candid, we were hopeful that we
would not have to make a disclosure.
Q. Why were you hopeful that you would not have to have to-you were hopeful
what, that one episode would not be enough to justify a disclosure?
A. Yes. It was an isolated uncontrolled incident.
Q. But you were certainly going to say if you found out a large series of question-
able payments, some of which you have candidly suggested might well be illegal,
you were going to have to make a disclosure, weren't you? You intended to make
a disclosure, you wanted to come clean, didn't you, with the SEC?
A. Well, no; we wanted to get the information on which I would make the deci-
sion whether there would be a disclosure, what kind there would, how it would
be made-all those things.
Proceedings on Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service Summons at 80-82.
123. Supra note 32. The Voluntary Disclosure Program contemplates revelation of pos-
sibly criminal acts on the part of subordinate employees in exchange for lenient treatment
of the corporation. The ethical implications of this conflict of interest are discussed in Sec.
IV infra.
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ducted the interviews and distributed the questionnaires in antici-
pation of litigation of these and other varieties.124 Thus, Upjohn
may well not have investigated itself but for perceived potential
legal liabilities wholly divorced from considerations of privilege. In
short, Upjohn had to conduct the investigation or face potentially
worse consequences. Similar considerations appear in each of the
other cases.125
124. Litigation arising from foreign payments abounds, so the fear of shareholder suits
is a real one. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (Control Data, charged criminally and civilly, paid approximately $1.4
million in fines for foreign payments); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,948 (D.D.C. 1979) (ITT charged with and
enjoined from making foreign and domestic payments and falsely accounting for same; spe-
cial "Review Person" appointed to monitor ITT's compliance); Rosengarten v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 820-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (shareholder suits alleging
fraud, waste, violation of fiduciary duties, as result of ITT payments between 1971-75); Se.
curities & Exchange Comm'n v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-76] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976) (consent judgment and injunction entered; Lockheed and
officers charged with secret payments to foreign officials, maintaining and falsely accounting
for a secret fund, lack of adequate records); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 509-12
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (shareholder derivative suit resulting from Exxon's payments, from 1963.
1972, of millions of dollars to Italian political parties).
125. At trial, Upjohn's general counsel further explained his corporation's motivation as
follows:
A. And I understand that I won't refer to the specific advice, "Do this, don't do
this, you should do this," but I think the areas in which legal problems arise and
legal counsel is desired, growing out of these payments, are several. I am not sure
I can even remember all of them, but a couple that come to mind, one of course
we have talked already about, "Does this violate the SEC laws? Are there any
actions that you are required to take because of the SEC laws? Are there any
obligations, legal obligations to advise your stockholder, the investigating pub-
lic?" That would be just starters in the SEC area. The obvious tax area, "Are
there any U.S. Tax Laws that you could be violating? Are there any adjustments
that the law requires in your tax return?" There are all sorts of currency con-
trols. These are not important in the U.S., but in foreign countries, there are
many currency controls, and these kinds of payments could involve those.
I think another legal area is the-and maybe this is more in the area of po-
tential litigation. Out of these payments, a great many stockholders suits have
grown up, and I think it was part of my advice and opinion to the Company of
how we should best act in order to avoid creating situations where stockholders
could bring action against us.
I think also-and I don't hold myself out as a foreign attorney, but we may
have more foreign than U.S. legal problems growing out of this. And certainly we
talked about some of those problems. I think the currency control would be an
illustration of that kind of thing. Obviously some of these payments that have
been disclosed violate the laws of the foreign countries.
So there are a whole myriad of legal problems growing out of this.
Proceedings on Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service Summons at 108-09.
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The Upjohn facts highlight an inconsistency between the Su-
preme Court's treatment of the subject matter test and the work-
product doctrine. The latter quasi-privilege depends for its validity
on proof that potential litigation over securities, taxes, violations of
fiduciary duties, and the like prompted the internal investigation.
In short, the corporation investigated because it feared litigation.
At the same time, the Upjohn Court reasoned that application of
the control group test would eviscerate the same investigation. The
work-product doctrine thus posits strong, independent reasons for
the investigation, reasons which are unlikely to be disturbed (and
in fact were not disturbed) by a narrow construction of the attor-
ney-client privilege.
3. Limits the availability of the privilege by denying it to cor-
porate bystander witnesses. Proponents of the subject matter test
argue that it will not shield the communications of a true "by-
stander" witness since by definition, such a witness is not acting
within the scope of his employment when he performs the acts or
observes the events recited in the communication. However, this
consideration has never been a factor in demarcating the bounds of
the attorney-client privilege; the bystander would enjoy no privi-
lege under the control group test either. Hickman v. Taylor 26 il-
lustrates the point. In Hickman, a damage action resulting from
the sinking of a tugboat, the lawyer defending the boat owners
took statements from eyewitness survivors among the crew. The
plaintiff's lawyer sought discovery of the statements. The Supreme
Court held that such statements were not privileged because they
In John Doe, Inc., the Court of Appeals adopted the district court's finding of fact that:
The objective of this investigation was not merely to ascertain the amount, if
any, of illicit foreign payments made during this period, but also for the purpose
of preparing an 8-K report which was to be submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. By submitting such a report John Doe hoped to partici-
pate in the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program and thereby avoid federal se-
curities litigation. A third purpose of the investigation was to prepare for possi-
ble government criminal and tax actions as well as shareholder derivative suit.
599 F.2d at 506. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Company), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d
Cir. 1977); Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977). In Sun
Company the court stated: "We do not doubt that the ability to conduct a confidential
investigation would make compliance with the complex laws governing corporate activity
more palatable . . . ; we doubt, however, that a corporation would risk civil or criminal
liability under those complex laws by foregoing introspection." Id. at 1237 (citation omit-
ted). See also United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980).
126. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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were not communications between lawyer and "client," but be-
tween lawyer and witness. Thus, at a minimum the "mere witness"
cannot take shelter under a lawyer's privilege. This purported ad-
vantage of the subject matter test is a truism, but one shared by
the control group test as well.127
B. Subject Matter Test-Negative Considerations
1. Creates a broad "zone of silence." Opponents of the subject
matter test argued that it would encompass potentially all corpo-
rate employees, no matter how high or low their rank. While this
test also requires that the communications involved be within the
subject matter of the employee's duties, this is not a severe restric-
tion. The corporation would not likely care if an employee com-
municates about a matter that has nothing to do with his job.
Therefore, there is simply no employee, and no subject matter of a
nature significant to the corporation, which would not be privi-
leged under this test.
In effect, there would be no such thing as a material non-priv-
ileged communication. Such a zone of silence, encompassing "large
number[s] of agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings
with lawyers" 128 is indeed large. Its breadth is an open invitation to
127. 329 U.S. 495 at 508. The Supreme Court's holding in this portion of Hickman is
somewhat cryptic. The persons interviewed by defendant's lawyer were clearly employees of
the partnership which owned the tug, yet the Court appears to have leaped to the conclu-
sion that they could not be shielded by the attorney-client privilege. It could be argued that
the Court thereby silently adopted the control group test, since the employees' statements
would have undoubtedly qualified for the privilege under the subject matter test but not the
control group test. Obviously it would be unusual to announce a doctrine of such importance
by unexpressed assumption. Nevertheless the Court, to reach the result, must have believed
the employees not to be sufficiently identified with the litigant-defendant to be the client as
well.
128. Simon, supra note 24, at 955-56. However, one writer has contended that the zone
of silence will be small or non-existent. Miller, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work Product Doctrine: Protection from Compelled Disclosure in Criminal Investiga-
tion of a Corporation, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 569 (1978). This is said to result from the fact that
corporate records and personnel are still available for inspection and testimony, and that in
practice, it is difficult for a corporation to funnel all sensitive communication through coun-
sel since that rerouting would interfere with effective corporate management. Those con-
siderations, if valid in any instance, do not hold in the case of a sensitive payments investi-
gation. The importance of the data would likely overcome any corporate business
inconvenience. While records and personnel may be available, the latter's memories have
likely faded, and the witnesses would be far less candid with a governmental investigator
who appears in an adversary role. Moreover, it is often crucial to have, together, documents
and the candid testimony of those who authored or worked with them. Such a combination
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corporations to attempt to bring as much data as possible within
the privilege. The zone is therefore subject to abuse. Cautious and
far-sighted corporate managers foresaw securities law, tax law, and
other violations and their legal consequences and commenced the
reported internal questionable payments investigations. They were
little motivated or encouraged by notions of privilege, and having,
in some cases, intended the body of data to be disclosed, they
turned their attention to the privilege when the results were sub-
poenaed or summoned, in later hope that an expansive interpreta-
tion would be available. As one writer has pointed out, the privi-
lege is often used to conceal legally dubious transactions; it is "a
device for cover-ups."19
2. Funnels sensitive information through corporate counsel,
hampering discovery. And 3. Encourages senior managers to ig-
nore important data. The subject matter test may encourage cor-
porations to direct the flow of, and manage information in a fash-
ion different from that dictated by purely business needs.
Ordinarily, the normal lines of business communication need not
be altered merely because some data might later on turn out to
have unanticipated legal significance. However, careful manage-
ment officials would have an incentive to structure the flow of data
differently if they knew from the outset that highly important or
sensitive data were about to be generated, such as, for example, in
a sensitive payments investigation, or patent-related data, or data
with anti-trust, securities, or other implications. If under Upjohn
and John Doe, Inc. a communication made directly to the corpora-
tion's top management would not be privileged, but a communica-
tion directed to the corporation's lawyers would, management
would have an incentive to order that all important communica-
tions take place directly to and through counsel.130 Indeed, there is
is unlikely to be available under the subject matter test.
129. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 1061, 1062 (1978).
130. This danger caused the Diversified Industries court to propose a modification of
the subject matter test which would require that the employee's corporate superior request
the employee to communicate with the lawyer to secure legal advice. 572 F.2d at 609. How-
ever, this "extra" requirement merely restates a necessary element of the privilege: the com-
munication must be made for the purpose of securing legal advice. If the requirement is
interpreted to mean that the specific communications must be specifically directed, poten-
tial for abuse still exists. At the first sign of a legal problem, management could simply
direct that all data flow through the lawyer, with comparatively little inconvenience accom-
panying such a course. In fact, in the questionable payments cases (except for the first stage
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very little to recommend any other course. If management desired
to know the details of the inquiry, it would need only ask the law-
yers and those communications would also be privileged.""' This
course of dealing has three advantages for management. First, it is
easy to administer, requiring only a directive or executive order (or
series of the same) naming the topics or communications to be
redirected.
Second, it shields the data by inhibiting discovery by any ad-
verse party. s2 The data are contained in the files of lawyers (where
it is privileged) and the memories of witnesses. Witnesses may be
inaccessible or reluctant; they may no longer be employed by the
company at the time their knowledge is sought. The civil litigant
may not have the resources required to assemble these data from
primary sources. For a governmental agency or other corporate ad-
versary the task is at least a great burden. All of these effects
would be permissible within the context of discovery rules whose
spirit is theoretically one of liberality and disclosure, or in the con-
text of an administrative agency investigation where the agency's
inquisitorial powers may be even greater than those of the ordinary
civil litigant.
Third, the subject matter test permits top management to
adopt a policy of purposeful ignorance of the details of unpleasant
or even illegal transactions.133 In addition to sensitive payments
practices, top management may need to gather additional facts
from lower corporate levels. Some of these facts and topics might
result in conclusions serious enough to warrant internal corrective
action, or even the filing of public documents such as 8-K reports,
of John Doe's investigation), that is what happened. See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227
(investigation taken over by counsel after non-lawyer auditors discovered potential im-
proper payments); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (second of two
internal investigations conducted entirely by lawyers). See also United States v. Schmidt,
360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (accountant hired, paid and directed by attorneys; explicit
employment agreement indicated that all records were property of attorneys, all billing was
to law firm and all information was to be held confidential).
131. Communications by a lawyer to his client are privileged only insofar as they reveal
or implicate the client's confidential communications to the lawyer. 8 WIGMORE, supra note
13, §§ 2290-2399.
132. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227; Gardner, A Personal Privilege for
Communications of Corporate Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DEr. L.J. 299
(1963); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group
Test, supra note 24.
133. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227.
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amended tax returns, environmental impact statements, etc. The
subject matter text effectively adopted in Upjohn would encourage
ignoring issues which preliminary inquiry (by the lawyer directly of
lower level management and employees) has shown to be relatively
minor. The preliminary data safe in the lawyer's hands, no further
concern need be entertained. Thus the expanded privilege may dis-
courage corporate self-policing, rather than the reverse.134
The Upjohn test potentially undercuts a second pillar of the
privilege, that of nurturing more open communications between
lawyer and client. To the extent top management has an incentive
to ignore data generated by its lawyers, it will see less need to take
action, so long as the lawyers assure it that the data present no
legal dangers. Thus, the policy-making branch of the "client" may
communicate less, not more, with its lawyers on some topics, sim-
ply because the sanctity of underlying data creates a disincentive
to act.1 5 The privilege was clearly not meant to encourage such a
result.
4. Operates to hide the truth. There is little disagreement
with the general proposition that the attorney-client privilege
stands as an obstacle to discovery of the truth. Wigmore notes that
"[n]evertheless, the privilege remains an exception to the general
duty to disclose. Its benefits are indirect and speculative; its ob-
struction is plain and concrete." 13 6 The Upjohn Court, however,
chose not to acknowledge or discuss this characteristic of the privi-
lege. Although this characteristic does not weigh the specific ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the two tests, it ought to inform
that weighing process. It should operate to foster a skeptical eye
toward attempts to broaden the privilege; and make more probable
the estimate of the likely abuses of a broader privilege. It should
134. See Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609.
135. This analysis continues to assume that the data are not of such legal or business
significance that action by top management is required. For example, an investigation may
reveal a pattern of questionable or sensitive payments which are not material enough to
warrant disclosure to the SEC or the IRS. Another investigation by corporate lawyers might
reveal that the company's oil tanker committed a technical, non-reportable violation of en-
vironmental regulations. In all of these, if the lawyers, after culling the facts, inform top
management in a general way that there has been a problem of a tax, environmental, securi-
ties, or other nature, but that their investigation has revealed nothing of such significance
that corporate action is necessary, the matter will probably end there. The corporation need
have no fear that a hostile litigant or prying administrative agency will later discover the
same data and come to a contrary conclusion.
136. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2294.
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foster a general hostility toward extensions of the privilege, partic-
ularly to vast numbers of individual employees who are outside its
original, historical scope.187
The discussion above recites incentives which have impelled
corporations to conduct internal investigations, even when the ap-
plicable law was the control group test. These investigations were
in fact carried out. Since the privilege must be framed by criteria
no more expansive than those minimally necessary to accomplish
its purposes, the subject matter concept is simply not needed.
C. Control Group Test-Positive Considerations
The drawbacks of the Upjohn test, in mirror image, point up
many of the advantages of the control group test. For example, the
control group test does not in fact restrict a witness' desire to com-
municate with corporate lawyers or officials, and it may encourage
corporations to learn the details of the acts which may expose the
corporation to liability. The control group test does not create a
potential zone of silence. It distinguishes clearly between the mere
bystander witness and the true client-the consumer of legal
advice.
1. Limits the availability of the privilege to those who are
true corporate decisionmakers. The proper limit of the attorney-
client privilege is that bare minimum shield which preserves free-
dom of communication and action (not the maximum which will
encourage the freest communication within the corporation). The
control group test recognizes that the attorney-client privilege
exists for the benefit of those top-level decisionmakers whose job it
is to act on the facts communicated to them in confidence. Anyone
else is a legal bystander and has no part in the second half of the
decisionmaking process which the privilege was designed to fos-
137. Last term, in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), the Court struck down
the spousal privilege as a bar to one spouse's testimony, given under a grant of immunity.
The Court stated:
Testimonal exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental princi-
ple that "the public ... has a right to every man's evidence." United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). As such, they must be strictly construed and
accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally pre-
dominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
445 U.S. at 50.
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ter-the making of the decision itself.'
2. Guards against limitations on discovery of evidence. The
control group test encourages centralized fact-gathering by forcing
the flow of the data to and through those small number of individ-
uals who have the power to take any suggested corrective action on
behalf of the corporation. It thus enables adverse parties to know
where facts are likely to be located, thereby aiding the swift and
economical discovery of those facts in litigation.
3. Provides sufficient protection combined with the attorney
work-product defense to foster self-policing. Corporations have an
incentive to conduct internal investigations under the control
group test because of supervening legal requirements, exposure to
liability, and the corporate instinct for self-preservation. Under
this test, the corporation may structure the investigations differ-
ently (depending on the imagination of the lawyers), and they may
be a less pleasant task, but they will go on. The case law shows
that investigations did in fact take place, even in those jurisdic-
tions where the control group test was actually or arguably the law.
4. Draws a bright, easily comprehended line demarcating the
boundaries of the privilege. Proponents of the control group test
err in asserting that it is easily administered. To determine who is
includable within the control group, requires at least some minimal
factual development in terms of title and functions.3 9 By contrast,
under the subject matter test all employees are covered so long as
the subject matter of the communication is reasonably related to
the employee's duties. (That determination is easily made, since an
employee's duties will usually be obvious or not subject to serious
dispute.) Moreover, in many cases, the composition of a corpora-
tion's control group is not easily determinable or fixed. For exam-
ple, suppose an employee-a vice-president for sales-sat in on
board meetings frequently, but could not vote, yet the Board solic-
138. The first step in the resolution of this legal problem is sifting through the facts
with an eye to those that are legally relevant.
139. See also Note, Privileged Communications-Who Can Speak For the Corporate
Client?, 44 Missouiu L. REV. 350, 355 n.26 (1979) (citing Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968) (dep't manager and assistant held to be control group members, research chemist
and research and development dep't group leaders were not); Congoleum v. GAF, 49 F.R.D.
82 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afl'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (corporate and divisional directors of
research held on facts not control group members); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.
Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (divisional manager and chief engineer held to be control group
members, two employees reporting to chief engineer were not)).
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ited and respected his advice. Whether such a person fits the defi-
nition is by no means clear.
The Supreme Court in Upjohn believed that the necessity for
case-by-case analysis of the control group's makeup was a disad-
vantage. However, as the opinion itself observes, questions of privi-
lege (even the very one before the Court) sometimes must be ad-
dressed on a case-by-case basis. In Upjohn, the Court's adoption of
the subject matter test means that case-by-case analysis is effec-
tively no longer necessary. Every employee is covered by the privi-
lege so long as the communication concerns his employment.
The traditional attorney-client privilege has never reached
that far. Persons could be "clients" when they sought legal advice
and non-clients at other times and for other purposes. Upjohn
eviscerates this measure or restraint of the privilege. The Court
had declared that in part since the narrow test is harder to apply,
the broader, easier test should be adopted.
D. Control Group Test-Negative Considerations
1. Inhibits intra-corporate communication by presenting a
Hobson's choice. And 2. Discourages self-policing by corporations.
Opponents of the control group test urge that it confronts the cor-
poration with a Hobson's choice-the need to obtain the data from
middle management versus the prospect of disclosure, thereby
chilling the free flow of information. 140
However, the existence of a choice between competing alterna-
tives-even a difficult choice-does no logically compel the conclu-
sion that some other solution should be adopted. The issue ought
not to depend on the fact that unpleasant consequences accom-
pany some acts. The control group test may not discourage the free
flow of information. The perhaps painful consequences of the con-
trol group test's narrow construction of the term "client" may be
an acceptable price for conducting business subject to securities,
tax and other legal consequences.
Ill. THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF Upjohn
The breadth of the Upjohn doctrine mandates a closer look at
140. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 391-92; Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 608-09 (quot-
ing Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C.
INn. COMM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1970).
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its wider implications and potential dangers to the evidence-gath-
ering process. These implications and dangers may be grouped into
two related categories: (a) the impact on corporate behavior and
the creative use of Upjohn by corporate counsel in the conduct of
corporate business including internal investigations, and (b) the
impact of Upjohn on satellite rules which govern the availability
or applicability of the attorney-client privilege. 141
A. Creative Use of the Broadened Privilege by Corporate
Counsel
The foregoing discussion hints at the potential impact on cor-
porate-legal behavior the Upjohn rules have sanctioned. As with
all such procedural rules, lawyers and clients will naturally try to
fashion their behavior to conform to a salutary rule or avoid the
effect of a detrimental one.
Upjohn has considerably simplified that task. The decision
has created the potential for shielding a large field of corporate
behavior. The Court has sanctioned the zone of silence; it remains
only for the zone to be occupied. That occupation will likely take
two forms.
First, corporations will continue to fulfill their obligations to
conduct internal investigations where warranted or appropriate.
After Upjohn, there is greater assurance that the results of careful
investigations designed and conducted to bolster the claim of privi-
lege, will indeed be privileged. For example, lawyers will insure
that they completely dominate the conduct of the investigation,
where non-lawyers occasionally intruded before (e.g., Diversified,
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Inc.)). They will structure
the inquiry so that they become the focus of all significant commu-
nications, 42 from or to the Board or Special Committee, ancillary
141. The problems posed by the work-product aspects of Upjohn are treated in Section
V infra. A comprehensive summary of the law relating to other sub-doctrines within the
attorney-client privilege appears in Brunner, Lesser and Fellner, Background Materials
Concerning the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, Part
I, Georgetown Seminar, copyright 1981 by Wald, Harkrader & Ross [hereinafter cited as
Brnner]. The following analysis of the impact of Upjohn on these sub-doctrines relies in
part on the Brunner format and scholarship; however, its conclusions are solely the respon-
sibility of the present author.
142. Upjohn has given impetus to seminars devoted in part to the "how to's" of struc-
turing the privilege for corporate counsel. See generally Corporate Counsel and Client Con-
fidences, published by Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education
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personnel or specialists hired for the investigation, or the employ-
ees who are the subjects of the inquiry. The investigation will be-
gin with a memorandum or resolution from the Board to the cor-
porate attorney reciting words to this effect: "The corporation
requests your legal advice and assistance in the following prob-
lem." The memorandum or Board resolution will empower the law-
yer to employ-at the lawyer's expense-necessary specialized or
ancillary assistance.4 3 The Board will expressly state its fear or
anticipation of named legal consequences, suits, etc. (so as to fulfill
the "anticipation of litigation" requirement of the work-product
doctrine). It will identify as much as possible the exact legal issues
involved, or potentially involved. The lawyers or top management
will mark all documents involved in the investigation "Privileged
and Confidential.' 44 They will segregate the documents into
separate files,145 access to which will be restricted to those who
"need to know."" They will clearly mark all communications to
and from counsel so as to reveal their origin in or destination to a
lawyer,1 47 and to show that the employee is acting within his du-
ties.148 The lawyer, and only the lawyer, will conduct all inter-
views. 4 9 He will take non-verbatim notes and preface any type-
written summary with words to this effect: "The following are non-
verbatim notes taken by the undersigned and reflect his impres-
sions and conclusions as to the legally significant facts recited by
the witness under the undersigned's questioning." At this stage
and at others the lawyer will create paper trails positively evidenc-
ing the confidential and legal character of the investigation. In
short, the lawyers will carefully carefully and demonstrably tailor
the investigation to the Upjohn facts (and to other requirements
of the privilege).
Division, April 23-24, 1981 (hereinafter, Georgetown Seminar), and in particular, Martin,
Administering the Attorney-Client Privilege Within Corporations, Part V, Georgetown Sem-
inar [hereinafter cited as Martin]; Haft, Special Counsel and Special Review Committees,
Part VI, Georgetown Seminar [hereinafter cited as Haft].
143. Martin, supra note 142, at 6; Haft, supra note 142, at 5.
144. Martin, supra note 142, at 1, 2; Haft, supra note 142, at 6,
145. For an example of problems resulting from failure to segregate privileged commu-
nications, see United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954);
Martin, supra note 142, at 5.
146. Martin, supra note 142, at 2; Diversified Industries, Inc., 572 F.2d at 609.
147. Martin, supra note 142, at 1-2.
148. Martin, id. at 1.
149. Haft, supra note 142, at 6.
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The second major area for the creative use of Upjohn lies in
the unexplored field of business operations. An internal investiga-
tion of business practices is clearly a legal matter, but many busi-
ness decisions are at most quasi-legal in origin or effect. Moreover,
many business decisions have no apparent present or future legal
significance. Nevertheless, the corporation may simply desire to
keep them secret. To the extent Upjohn elevates the corporate
lawyer's role, future cases may see the lawyer intrude more and
more into the once exclusive province of business decisions in or-
der to extend the privilege, even if the immediate need for such
protection is not apparent. Upjohn itself appears to sanction this
intrusion. The Court noted with approval that "corporations con-
stantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law."150 In view of
the "vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation con-
fronting the modern corporation," 151 and of the "watchdog" or
public protection aspects of the lawyer's role which the Court
found in part to justify the privilege, lawyers can imbue almost any
business decision with legal significance. Therefore, a corporation
which desires to shield business decisions or practices that harbor,
for example, potential antitrust implications, i.e., marketing deci-
sions, corporate expansion plans, new product line acquisitions,
would begin by consulting its lawyers and consigning the matter to
them for legal advice. Properly managed, facts, communications
and decisions which are filtered through a lawyer, have a greater
chance of maintaining the claim of privilege than those which the
businessman alone handles.
Moreover, after Upjohn, the careful corporate chief will have
an incentive to request legal advice where only business judgments
appear to him to be involved (and where the chief would not have
done so before) for fear the facts would later be compelled in pri-
vate or Governmental litigation. This incentive to "bring in the
lawyers" for important business (as contrasted with purely legal)
matters has no downside risks. The corporation is likely to obtain
protection as to most sensitive business matters, such as pricing
policies, some contracts with customers or suppliers, mergers, ac-
quisitions, or relationships with subsidiaries, whether or not it has
150. 449 U.S. at 392 (quoting Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corpo-
rate Arena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901, 913 (1969)).
151. Id.
1981]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
good reason to obtain privileged status.152 These sensitive matters
are the ones most likely to be protectable under Upjohn, simply
because Upjohn shows how to construct a case to erect the privi-
lege and approves its expansive use.
In sum, by sanctioning a broad privilege, Upjohn permits the
privilege to be asserted not only in legal affairs, where it was meant
to apply, but also in business affairs of major, or, if the corporation
desires, minor importance. The cost to the truth-finding process in
the lower courts may be substantial.
B. Application to Other Principles of the Privilege
1. The requirement of intened and unbreached confidential-
ity. The confidentiality doctrine-that a communication cannot be
privileged unless it was made in confidence and that confidence
was never breached 153 -is untouched in Upjohn, at least on the
surface. The Court's silence is troublesome not only because the
government devoted its lead argument to this theory,'" but also
because the government had argued the issue in the Court of Ap-
peals (which rejected it) 55 and in the District Court (which ac-
cepted it).156 The Supreme Court's silence stands in the face of the
following circumstances: (1) Upjohn's general counsel knew at the
outset that SEC public reporting requirements, currency law, and
tax law reporting requirements loomed, depending on the facts un-
covered; (2) Upjohn in fact filed publicly required reports 57 with
the SEC (copy to IRS); (3) those reports disclosed to the SEC,
shareholders and the public the general subject matter of the privi-
leged communications, the dollar totals of foreign payments and
the countries involved; (4) Upjohn's general counsel had an under-
152. See, e.g., the facts of Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
153. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954); United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
154. Brief for Appellees, at 21-26. This doctrine is a cousin of the waiver argument. The
confidentiality requirement means a communication must be confidential to be privileged. If
a communication is privileged, any breach of the confidentiality after acquisition of the
privilege is a waiver.
155. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1224, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979).
156. United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,597, 83,602-03 (1978).
157. An 8-K report was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
Rule 13a-11. This disclosure document reports "material" changes in the reporting company
in such areas as change of control, bankruptcy, resignation of a director because of disagree-
ment with the company's operations, policies or practices. See also note 31 supra.
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standing with the SEC that the Commission could demand to see
additional and presumably privileged background facts, this option
being a salient feature of the Voluntary Disclosure Program; (5)
the Special Committee had been authorized to engage admittedly
independent outside certified public accountants to assist it; their
independence was noted several times in the Board's authorizing
resolution; (6) the Chairman encouraged potential interviewees to
reveal facts upon request to the outside accountants; and (7) the
corporation actually revealed-to the SEC, IRS and shareholders
in publicly filed documents-the general nature of the payments,
their gross amount, the countries involved, and other data. In spite
of these facts, the Supreme Court found no lack or breach of confi-
dentiality. This part of the Court's decision has two aspects. The
first deals with the traditional lack of confidentiality argument
that the Government made. The second deals with Upjohn's "con-
sumer protection" flavor in which the Court appears to undercut
the confidentiality requirement by justifying the expanded
privilege.
In simplest terms, the Government argued that the above facts
showed that the privilege never existed because Upjohn never in-
tended the data it gathered to be confidential. If, however, it did so
intend, once the corporation decided to reveal those data in sum-
mary fashion, it waived the privilege, or, alternatively, it was es-
topped from asserting it. The rationale underlying this concept of
"intention to disclose" derives from several cases in the law of
summons enforcement and finds support in other fields. In United
States v. Merrel,158 a special agent of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice's Criminal Investigation Division investigated two taxpayers
for possible criminal tax law violations. One taxpayer had retained
Merrell, a lawyer, to prepare the taxpayers' federal income tax re-
turns from various workpapers and records the taxpayers provided.
The special agent issued a summons to the lawyer to appear and
produce retained copies of the returns, summaries of income and
expenses used to prepare the returns, and workpapers and sched-
ules used in their preparation. Upon the attorney's failure to com-
ply with the summons, the government brought an enforcement
suit.159 The lawyer then invoked the attorney-client privilege. The
158. 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
159. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a).
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district court rejected the claim on the theory that the summoned
data consisted of information that the client did not intend to be
confidential. Retained copies of income tax returns were not confi-
dential since the material revealed on them was intended to be dis-
closed to third parties, namely, the Internal Revenue Service. The
court reasoned the same to be true for the underlying data, con-
sisting of income and expense summaries that the lawyer gathered
or prepared for the purpose of including the information (as sifted,
analyzed, and arranged by the accountant) on the return. The
court ruled that, by definition, the accountant's workpapers con-
sisted of information which the client and lawyer intended to be
transcribed onto the non-confidential return.160
In United States v. Cote,161 the court in a similar factual set-
ting"1 2 rejected the claim of privilege as to amended tax returns
and such underlying data as the return itself reasonably disclosed.
The court framed its holding in terms of waiver; by filing the
amended returns, the taxpayers communicated in part the sub-
stance of the information on them to the government and therefore
could not withhold the underlying data. The initial disclosure
waived whatever privilege may have been available. The court
stated that it was "well established that communications between
an attorney and his client, though made privately, are not privi-
leged if it was understood that the information communicated...
was to be conveyed to others."163
160. 303 F. Supp. at 493. Accord, Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (recognizing that a great deal of information given
to lawyers is in fact intended to be disclosed).
161. 326 F. Supp. 444 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
162. The taxpayers had for several years employed Donald Cote, an accountant, to pre.
pare their federal tax returns. Cote used summaries of the books and records of the taxpay-
ers for this purpose. Their 1967 return came under audit, and the accountant referred the
matter to a lawyer, who retained the accountant to conduct an audit of the taxpayers' books
and records. The results of the audit induced the lawyer to advise the taxpayers to file
amended returns for 1966, 1967 and 1968, which they did. The amended returns revealed,
without explanation, additional income. A special agent of the Internal Revenue Service
then summoned both the lawyer and accountant to appear and produce all workpapers used
to prepare the original and amended returns. The accountant claimed the papers were in
the lawyer's possession. The lawyer produced the original 1967 tax return but otherwise
claimed the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir.
1958).
163. Whether phrased in terms of waiver or intent to disclose, the doctrine is the same.
Anything but an accidental waiver is also indicative of an intention to disclose. This concept
of waiver has had a mixed judicial reception. Even in Cote, the court warned that "[floo
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Closely allied to the Merrell-Cote rationales are the public
policy considerations in United States v. Couch.164 An IRS agent
summoned a taxpayer's accountant for the accountant's records
pertinent to the investigation of the taxpayer. The intervening tax-
payer defended in part by raising the claim of accountant-client
privilege. The Court rejected the claim, noting that no federal law
sanctioned an accountant's privilege, and no state law adopting
such a privilege had been recognized in federal cases. The Court
further stated: "Nor is there justification for such a privilege where
records relevant to income tax returns are involved in a criminal
investigation or prosecution.' 6 5 The Court would not recognize a
privilege where the taxpayer handed records to an accountant and
knew in advance that mandatory disclosure of "much of the infor-
mation therein" would be required in an income tax return. Sec-
ond, the data to be disclosed were largely in the accountant's dis-
broad an application of the rule of waiver requiring unlimited disclosure by reason of filing
an income tax return might tend to destroy the salutary purposes of the privilege which
invite confidentiality between the attorney and his client." 456 F.2d at 145 n.4 (citations
omitted). The Court of Appeals in Upjohn rejected the Government's suggestion of waiver,
holding that the extent of waiver is measured by that which is actually disclosed. 600 F.2d
at 1227 n.12, rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See also Matter of Fishel, 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.
1977) (no waiver as to data underlying revealed worksheets); United States v. Schlegel, 313
F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Neb. 1970); International Business Machines Corp. v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
The Supreme Court has held that waiver may be express or implied. Blackburn v.
Crawfords, 70 U.S. 175 (1865). See also United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048,
1057 (D. Md. 1971) (checks stubs were intended to be disclosed since taxpayer had given
them to accountant for preparation of return); B&C Trucking Co. v. Holmes & Narver, Inc.,
39 F.R.D. 317, 319-20 (D. Hawaii 1966) (waiver by filing application with regulatory agency);
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464-65 (E.D. Mich. 1954) (docu-
ments not intended to be confidential where they had been mixed indiscriminately with
routine documents in company files).
It may be possible for the lawyer to avoid these dangers by effectively making the ac-
countant his creature. Ancillary or subordinate personnel (such as paralegals and secretar-
ies) often partake of the lawyer's privilege. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339
(M.D. Pa. 1973) (lawyer hired accountant, whose services were rendered to facilitate accu-
rate and complete legal consultation); Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966) (tax-
payer's lawyer hired, paid and instructed accountant). Compare United States v. De Castro,
West & Chodorow, Inc., 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,563 (C.D. Cal. 1975) with Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953). The claim of privilege will be sustained as to an ac-
countant where the lawyer can prove that the assistance of an accountant is "necessary, or
at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which
the privilege is designed to permit." United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir.
1961). The line, however, is a fine one.
164. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
165. Id. at 335.
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cretion, not the client's. Third, an accountant himself would risk
prosecution if he assisted in preparation of a false return.16 8 The
accountant's need for self-protection would often require that he
have the right to disclose the information upon demand. Thus the
Court rejected the concept of a legitimate expectation of privacy
(closely akin to the concept of privacy which forms part of the at-
torney-client privilege) where other laws mandated expectations
and obligations of disclosure and where the Court thought the
principle of disclosure to be essential for the system of self-report-
ing to survive.
These factors find an analogy in the questionable payments
cases, where the corporation, through a special committee assisted
by lawyers, generates factual data and summarizes them in a re-
port to the Board of Directors. The summarized data reveal the
corporation's questionable payment practices and frequently in-
clude examples of payments0 7 (with the names of participants
omitted), summaries of total payments, recipient countries,168 and
the like.169 These summarized disclosures are likely to be more de-
tailed than the bare revelations made in the tax returns described
in Merrell and Cote. The corporation knows at the start that there
may be securities, tax, and perhaps other legal implications to the
data to be generated, e.g., 8-K statements and/or amended tax re-
turns. Thus the corporation's intention from the start includes, if
necessary, the revelation of at least summaries of the questionable
payments data to the SEC or the IRS, or both (hence the name,
Voluntary Disclosure Program). This pre-existing intention to dis-
close, we now know, was later carried through in at least one in-
stance,17 0 and likely with a greater degree of specificity than that
found in the usual corporate tax return.
Like the taxpayer in Couch, the corporation which investigates
166. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).
167. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,599.
168. Id.
169. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Company, Inc.), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Audit Committee report discussed payment of $235,000 to foreign representative during
renegotiation of contract with an entity of foreign government); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(John Doe, Inc.), 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (subsidiary of John Doe used money to bribe
Mexican officials).
170. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Inc.), 599 F.2d at 506, 512 (SEC given
specific details from Form 8-K, John Doe employees identified, recipient countries identi-
fied, amounts and purposes of payments set forth).
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itself often intends the data to be disclosed in summary fashion.
Like the accountant, the corporation (and perhaps, the lawyers)
face exposure to liability if false statements are made. Under these
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the corpora-
tion had never intended the data to be confidential. The corpora-
tion which chooses to participate in the Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram, or which generates internal investigative data because it
fears private shareholder suits and wishes to forestall them by a
required public disclosure or by application of the business judg-
ment rule, 17 effectively demonstrates its intention that the data
not be confidential under all circumstances. Until Upjohn, even if
its subjective intent is to the contrary, Couch implied that such an
intent is not one which public policy would endorse, since the cir-
cumstances are charged with such a high degree of public interest.
Since the attorney-client privilege attaches to the substance of a
communication and not the particular words used, 72 the corpora-
tion which has slightly opened the door should not be able to pre-
vent complete disclosure.
The Supreme Court justified its holding in part by reasoning
that corporations constantly go to their lawyers to find out how to
obey a vast and complicated array of public regulations. This no-
tion of the lawyer as public "ombudsman," strongly implied in
Upjohn, is made explicit in other cases. For example, in United
States v. Handler,'" the district court firmly endorsed its own eq-
uity powers to require the appointment of special counsel under an
SEC consent decree. Special counsel had discharged his duty to
monitor the offender's compliance with the securities laws by con-
ducting an investigation which included interviews with corporate
officers. On the basis of his report, certain officers were indicted for
securities law violations. The court was unsympathetic to the inter-
viewee-officers' claims that they and special counsel enjoyed a priv-
ileged relationship which should have precluded revelation of spe-
cial counsel's notes. "Self-policing of internal corporate affairs is a
171. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel., 466 F. Supp. 817, 823-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus,
313 F. Supp. 224, 225-26 (D. Del. 1970) (waiver by testimony on general subject matter of
privileged material).
172. United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 448 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821
(1958).
173. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,519 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1978).
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desirable and economical practice. ' 17 4 Thus, where the very pur-
pose of counsel's appointment was to report to the SEC and to the
public, no confidentiality was intended and no privilege obtained.
In Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Canadian Javelin,
Ltd.,17 5 the SEC sought to compel discovery of the notes of a law-
yer who had been appointed special counsel to the corporation
under an earlier consent decree. The decree had enjoined Canadian
Javelin from making false or misleading statements, and had re-
quired it to establish a standing committee to review all informa-
tion to be disseminated to the public. A special independent coun-
sel, who "shall have no business or professional relationship with
Javelin other than the performance of the functions set forth
herein,"1 78 was to monitor compliance. The court held the special
counsel's investigation not to be privileged. His obligations ran to
the court "and to the American public. Furthermore, [special
counsel] was obliged to make certain public disclosures with re-
spect to Javelin's activities. Thus there could be no legitimate
expectation of confidentiality in connection with any information
divulged to [special counsel] and accordingly such information is
not privileged."'1 77
The objective roles and functions of these special counsel do
not differ materially from those of Upjohn-type Special Commit-
tees and their lawyers even if the principal's subjective expecta-
tions may differ. In both circumstances, the purpose of the investi-
gation is to monitor.compliance with the law and report the results
to the SEC under the Voluntary Disclosure Program, to sharehold-
ers, etc. In both, there is an explicit public protection aspect,
whether voluntarily assumed or court-imposed.
Yet the Supreme Court's silence on these points is deceptive.
The Court appears to endorse, perhaps for the first time, the idea
that the attorney-client privilege is justifiable at least in part to
promote quasi-public purposes, that is, concerns and constituen-
cies broader than those of the individual or corporate client.
Upjohn's privilege has a distinct, explicit, quasi-public, quasi-in-
dependent flavor of shareholder and public protection. The privi-
174. Id. at 94,024.
175. 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978).
176. Id. at 596.
177. Id. See also Bird v. Penn Central Co., 61 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (waiver by
disclosure to SEC).
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lege exists, the Court would have us believe, to assist corporations
in complying with "the vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation" 17 8 confronting them.
But by sanctioning the privilege for such broader, non-private
purposes, the Court erodes the strictness of the confidentiality re-
quirement. By extolling the virtues of special committees and in-
ternal investigations for these quasi-public purposes, the Court
may have also gone a long way toward elevating those purposes,
and their constituencies, i.e., public, shareholders, environmental
groups, to protected or protectable status. The lawyer who investi-
gates a corporation may be seen to do so in part for the benefit of
persons who cannot possibly be clients.17 9 Thus the "public pur-
pose" aspect of the decision, which is supposed to require a privi-
lege, in fact undercuts its own rationale for confidentiality. In the
name of protecting the attorney-client privilege, Upjohn may come
to be seen to have done the reverse.
2. Attorney-to-client communications and intra-corporate
contacts. The law is generally divided on the issue whether the
privilege protects the attorney's communication to the client as
well as the reverse. Some courts narrowly construe the privilege to
include the lawyer's communication only where it would explicitly
or inferentially reveal the facts the client had told to the lawyer. 80
Others believe the advice itself to be within the privilege, regard-
less of content.181 Upjohn is strongly allied with the latter view.
"the privilege exists to protect ... professional advice to those
who can act on it. . ," 182 regardless of the circumstances necessi-
tating the advice. The Court faulted the control group test for
making it difficult for the corporate attorney to formulate sound
advice and for limiting "the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to
178. 449 U.S. at 392.
179. Query: What if these new constituencies begin to demand the results?
180. See generally Brunner, supra note 141, at 13-24, and cases cited therein: Federal
Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D.D.C. 1979), af'd on other grounds,
628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 522 (D. Conn.),
appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); Bird v. Penn Central Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 45-
46 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. United Shoe Mach., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950).
181. See Brunner, supra note 141, at 13-24, and cases cited therein: United States v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir. 1968); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93
(10th Cir. 1968); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
182. 449 U.S. at 390.
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ensure their client's compliance with the law."18 It thus implied
that the lawyer's communications to the client are also privileged.
The Upjohn Court clearly wished to protect the entire two-way
process of communication because it believed that advice was of
great significance to non-control group personnel as well as to top
management, and because in Upjohn, the result of the legal advice
was a worldwide company policy against bribery.
Assuming such two-way protection, non-legal personnel must
communicate with each other in order to respond to the corporate
attorney's inquiries. Generally, such communications among non-
lawyers are not privileged, but exceptions do exist.18 Upjohn may
afford greater protection to such communications. On its facts, the
decision sustained the privilege for communications based on in-
quiries Upjohn's managers had made with "employees who might
be helpful in providing the requested information." 185 The Court
set no limit on the number of lower-level employees whom the law-
yer could consult. At the very least, the Court extended the privi-
lege to communications from lower-level employees to each other if
they had made the communication in response to counsel.
Potential difficulties accompany these two related aspects of
the privilege. To the extent that Upjohn gives wider protection to
both attorney-to-client advice and to intra-personnel communica-
tions, the corporation will have an incentive to channel inquiries of
a sensitive nature (particularly those not directly involving top
management) through its attorneys. The danger that the control
group test anticipated becomes real: the zone of silence is ex-
panded by management's purposeful ignorance of important facts
or by the transformation of ordinary business decisions into legal
decisions.
3. Ancillary personnel. Authorities are divided on whether,
and under what circumstances, the privilege may cover non-legal
personnel who assist the lawyer in his duties.1 88 Courts have recog-
nized that even beyond ministerial employees (secretaries, clerks,
etc.), lawyers need the help of specialists in order to do their job
well. Where the specialist does not have independent contractor
183. Id. at 392.
184. Brunner, supra note 141, at 24-26, and cases cited in Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc.,
61 F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
185. 449 U.S. at 387.
186. See generally Brunner, supra note 141, at 39-47.
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status, there are no fixed rules. The decisions run the following
range: (1) no privilege except for ministerial agents;187 (2) no privi-
lege if the engagement of the specialist preceded the hiring of the
lawyer, or if the specialist rendered advice at the behest of the cli-
ent rather than the lawyer; "8 (3) no privilege unless the specialist
was essential to the lawyer's performance of legal services; 8 9 (4)
the privilege applies wheie the specialist's help is "necessary, or at
least highly useful," for the consultation the privilege is designed
to permit;190 and (5) the privilege applies where the specialist was
engaged, paid, or directed by the lawyer. 91
Upjohn implies that there will be greater protection for such
ancillary specialists. The Special Committee in Upjohn, after all,
was empowered to, and did, engage independent accountants to as-
sist it in interpreting the results of the investigation. The privilege
was not lost due to this fact. Moreover, the Court's reference to the
vast array of regulations governing modern corporations implies
that it would sanction the use of specialists in regulatory compli-
ance matters and protect their work product. This wider availabil-
ity of the privilege for ancillary personnel appeared in questionable
payments cases prior to Upjohn.92 Carefully structured, the claim
of privilege or work product for such specialists will likely survive
future challenges.
4. Attorney as businessman. The rule that an attorney who
acts as a businessman enjoys no privilege for such activity has al-
ways been easier to state than to apply. Many tests appear to have
been articulated. 93 Upjohn appears to utilize parts of several tests,
187. Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 160 (1979); or immediate sub-
ordinates, e.g., Zenith Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del 1954).
188. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Clark,
74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,764 (D.C. Idaho 1974).
189. Burlington v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.C. Md. 1974).
190. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
191. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
192. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 498 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (privilege
applies to documents prepared by outside accountants under lawyers' aegis). Accord, In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (accountants' workpapers possibly sub-
sumed in attorney work product).
193. See generally Brunner, supra note 141, at 30-36, and cases noted: United States v.
Faltico, 586 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1978); Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603
(8th Cir. 1978) (test is whether non-legal personnel could have performed the investigation);
United States v. Lipshy, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,274 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (general relationship of
attorney to client examined); Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 398-400 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
remanded on other grounds, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S.
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without articulating one uniform rule. First, the Supreme Court
approvingly noted that the communications involved were made to
corporate counsel "acting as such,"' 19 4 thus focusing on the general
role of the lawyer. Second, the lawyer conducted "a factual investi-
gation."1 95 Third, the purposes of the investigation were "to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the questionable payments" and "to
be in a position to give legal advice to the company with respect
to the payments."1' Fourth, one result of the investigation was a
policy statement with both legal and business implications. Per-
haps the only conclusion which can be drawn from the Court's ob-
servations is that the lawyer may act in part as a businessman
without sacrificing the privilege, and may give advice with an ele-
ment of business content, so long as (1) he also acts in his capacity
as a lawyer, and (2) the advice is of a legal as well as of a business
character. Upjohn thus appears to grant protection to advice of
mixed character, which is indeed the class of advice a corporate
lawyer would be expected to give.
Beyond this conclusion, the extent to which communications
an attorney makes as a businessman will be privileged remains un-
certain. The lines are likely to be further blurred as corporations
take up the invitation to bring lawyers increasingly into business
decisionmaking.
IV. THE PRIVILEGE-ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Upjohn hints at one topic of perhaps the greatest potential
difficulty for lawyers. The Upjohn rule will begin to draw law-
yers-largely without warning because of the tempting breadth of
the holding-into a minefield of ethical dilemmas and problems of
constitutional rights. The Court's virtual silence on these potential
ethical problems stands as a further criticism of the holding. In an
internal investigation of questionable payments, the corporation
requires its lower-level employees to disgorge facts and practices
153 (1979) (intention to evoke legal, as opposed to business or professional advice); Zenith
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. at 794 (examine the particular communica-
tion); United States v. United Shoe Mach., 89 F. Supp. 357 (overall character of attorney's
work for client examined).
194. 449 U.S. at 394.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,597, 83,598, 83,599) (original emphasis).
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which may expose them to individual criminal liability. What is
the corporation's duty in that situation? May its lawyers ethically
represent both the corporation and the non-control group employ-
ees? Does there exist a sensitive payments investigation in which
the corporation and its non-control group employees do not have
irreconcilable conflicts of interest? Would the continued fiction of
one lawyer or law firm representing both management (the control
group) and other employees cause the latter to forfeit important
rights? The answers to these and related questions ought to have
influenced the selection of the proper measure of "the client" for
purposes of the attorney-client privilege, since they bear on the
congruence of the identity of interests between the corporation and
its employees. Moreover, these questions reveal the dimensions of
the ethical problems with which Upjohn will confront courts and
lawyers in the future.
A. Conflict of Interest
These topics are best illuminated by considering the lawyer's
ethical obligations. The most prominent ethical consideration is
the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest when representing
multiple clients.197 The American Bar Association's Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, and Canons 5-15198 and 5-18199 in particu-
lar, commit the legal profession to an ethic which not only discour-
ages, but nearly bans, representation of multiple clients with
potentially conflicting interests. For example, EC 5-15 provides
that a lawyer who is requested to represent multiple clients with
potentially conflicting interests "must" weigh "carefully" the possi-
bility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if
he accepts the position. "He should resolve all doubts against the
propriety of the representation. A lawyer should never represent in
litigation multiple clients with differing interests; and there are few
situations in which he would be justified in representing in litiga-
tion multiple clients with potentially differing interests." 00
As to what choice the lawyer should make when he represents
a corporation, the Code takes a consistent position: "A lawyer
197. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 5-14 through 5-20.
198. Id., EC 5-15.
199. Id., EC 5-18.
200. Id., EC 5-15 (footnote omitted).
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employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer,
employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity." 01
The circumstances under which a corporate lawyer 0 2 might
run afoul of these ethical canons arise both at the investigative
stage of an internal inquiry and, later, at the litigation stage, when
the government seeks to compel production of the results of the
investigation.2 03 The subject matter test tends to widen the gap be-
tween the interests and identities of the non-control group employ-
ees and the corporate client where such conflicts arise.
In the typical questionable payments investigation, the lawyer
is charged with discovering whether the client-corporation has or
may have violated the securities, tax, or other laws, and whether
such violations subject it to civil or criminal liability. Since the
"corporation" is an abstraction which operates only through agents
and employees, the lawyer's task is to discover which management
and lower-level employees have violated the law. In this limited
201. Id., EC 5-18. The canon further provides:
In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his
professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any
person or organization. Occasionally, a lawyer for an entity is requested by a
stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person con-
nected with the entity to represent him in an individual capacity; in such case
the lawyer may serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced that differing
interests are not present.
202. It is ethically permissible, under some circumstances, for a lawyer to represent
several clients "whose interests are not actually or potentially differing." EC 5-19. However,
the lawyer is obligated to explain any circumstances which might cause the client to ques-
tion the lawyer's undivided loyalty, and in doubtful cases, the client's choice govems. It does
not appear that in any of the questionable payments cases the "clients" were even advised
of the problem, much less given a choice. Disciplinary Rule DR 5-105 generally forbids a
lawyer from accepting or continuing employment which is "likely" to involve conflicting
interests, except "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if
each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such repre-
sentation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each." ABA
CODE OF PRO1EssIONAL RSPoNsmurrY, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(c). As the main discussion
analyzes, there are several major, perhaps irreconcilable, conflicts of interest between the
corporation and its employees-interviewees in a questionable payments investigation. In
view of these, it does not seem possible for one lawyer or law firm to represent both within
the bounds of the canons..
203. It is clear that in the typical questionable payments investigation, the "corpora-
tion" is perceived to be the client when the lawyer is initially retained, thereby establishing
at the outset of the relationship the lawyer's coverage under EC 5-18. See, e.g., the Board of
Directors resolution in Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d 596, quoted at note 57 supra.
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respect the lawyer's function resembles that of a governmental
investigator.
Under the control group test, the lawyer represents only those
persons who comprise top managment, and only in their agency
capacity. Under the subject matter test, however, the lawyer would
"represent" all employees whose duties may have included the
maintenance or operation of a slush fund.204
The client-corporation's interest, as promoted by the lawyer's
investigation, is to discover the facts and, quite possibly, to reveal
those facts in order to avoid multiple corporate liability. The indi-
vidual interests of non-control group employees may be diametri-
cally opposed. They would wish to conceal any damaging facts
since those facts might expose them to individual criminal or civil
liability. Thus the corporation, wishing to preserve its rights and
interests, calls upon its employees' institutional loyalty with the
result that the employees may incriminate themselves.20 5
204. Members of the control group may also have participated in the maintenance and
operation of a slush fund and may also be interviewed by the lawyers. The treatment of
these individuals, however, is likely to be different from that of the employees. As members
of the control group (frequently members of the board of directors), these individuals have
access to information not available to non-control group members. They will know the how
and why of the investigation; they will likely be informed by the lawyer of all potential
consequences of the probe. More importantly, they have the power to affect corporate ac-
tion. While the ethical climate of dual representation of corporation and control group is far
from pure, it is also qualitatively different (and improved) from that existing between cor-
poration and non-control group employees.
205. The Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar dealt with a situation
closely in point in Opinion No. 14, 75-1-24 (January 26, 1976). The inquiry requested advice
about several issues in a situation where an attorney once represented a client (now repre-
sented by another law firm) in connection with civil litigation by a government regulatory
agency. The attorney's files relating to the former client were subpoenaed by a grand jury.
In addition, the attorney had also represented jointly a corporate client which subsequently
waived its attorney-client privilege. The Committee commented:
None of our answers is affected by the fact that the representation of the
client in question was a joint representation, along with a corporate client that
subsequently waived its attorney-client privilege. That waiver frees the lawyer to
produce documents that relate solely to the corporate client so far as any claims
to confidentiality by it are concerned, but it does not free him to disclose docu-
ments that relate in any way to the former individual client. In this regard, we
note that, when an attorney undertakes to reprsent a corporate officer in his
individual capacity and also to represent the corporation, documents obtained or
produced during such joint representation frequently, if not invariably, inter-
twine the interests of the joint clients. Such joint representation is fraught with
potential conflict and a lawyer should represent a corporate official in his indi-
vidual capacity and also represent the corporation only if the lawyer is con-
vinced that differing interests, or potentially differing interests, are not
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The fact that the non-contr.group interviewees are unlikely
to perceive such a conflict when the interviews take place points to
a second aspect of this conflict. Since the lawyer acts as a private
investigator, and the typical interview is non-custodial, the lawyer
is under no constitutional duty to advise the interviewees that they
might be incriminated.06
But the potential for self-incrimination is real. Unlike the
individual, the corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination;201 therefore, the individual's narration
of facts to the lawyer cannot be protected under a Fifth Amend-
ment claim the corporation may assert. Thus the lawyer who inter-
views a non-control group employee effectively asks that employee
to forfeit his own Fifth Amendment rights where the lawyer knows
(but the employee may not) that the corporation could not protect
his disclosures. The corporation may indeed have no institutional
interest in asserting a Fifth Amendment right. The employee is
thus placed in a pressured situation, left to determine on his own
whether he has a self-incrimination problem, and if so, what rights
he has. While the holding of Miranda v. Arizona20 8 would not
strictly apply, the typical questionable payments interview jeopar-
dizes the interests Miranda sought to protect-informed choice
and conflict-free legal representation. But for the "private" hat
worn by the lawyer-investigator, it seems clear that the non-control
group employees would otherwise be protected.
A third conflict arises when one considers the desirability and
capacity to waive whatever attorney-client privilege may exist. The
corporation may well desire to waive its privilege by disclosing suf-
ficient data to the SEC to bring it within the Voluntary Disclosure
presented. EC 5-15; EC 5-17; and EC 5-18.
Id.
In the questionable payments cases, it is likely that the interview notes taken by the
lawyers generated the very intertwining of conflicting interests foreseen by the Opinion.
This would clearly be true if an interviewee revealed that, at the direction of the Board
Chairman, he set up and operated a slush fund.
206. The advice of rights required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies
only in the context of a custodial interrogation conducted by a governmental police agency.
See United States v. Beckwith, 425 U.S. 431 (1976).
207. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911). The privilege belongs only to the individual; thus, other institutional entities do not
have a self-incrimination privilege. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnership);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (union).
208. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Program, as did Upjohn and John Doe, Inc. 20 9 However, if the non-
control group employees are part of "the client," they should have
the right to decide whether their privilege should be waived, and
under what circumstances. 1 0 In practice, that principle has not
been followed, at least as demonstrated in Upjohn. Indeed, corpo-
rate management might consider it ludicrous that its own lower-
level employees would claim authority to dictate to the corporation
what could and what could not be revealed to a governmental
agency. After all, management not the employees, is charged with
formulating such high-level policies. 211 None of the cases in this
area indicate that any of the investigated corporations entertained
such a conception of employee authority,1 2 and management
would probably violate one or more corporate fiduciary principles
if it permitted control of the privilege to slip away.21 8 Thus the
209. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979). John Doe actually re-
vealed some details of its investigation in a conference with SEC representatives.
210. This is so since the privilege belongs to the client alone and therefore can be
waived only by him. Where the corporate client waives its privilege and the individual does
not, the lawyer is probably trapped in an irreconcilable conflict of interests. See Legal
Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, supra note 205.
211. The likely fact and subjective belief by the control group (principally the board of
directors) that it makes corporate business and legal policy, rather than lower-level employ-
ees, is a good indication that the control group itself probably believes that only it repre-
sents, and is identified with, "the client."
212. The reverse factual situation is also possible: the employee-"client" may wish to
waive the privilege while the corporation wishes to assert it, as, for example, when the em-
ployee requests immunity from prosecution, a reduced sentence for cooperation, or when he
simply wishes the truth to come out. Under those circumstances, it strains credibility to
imagine that the corporate entity would be at the forefront of the chorus urging that the
employee is the client, or is closely indentified with the corporation. More likely, the corpo-
ration would urge that the employee does not speak for the corporation, has no authority to
waive the privilege, and is not a member of the control group which does. The corporation's
collective interest lies in asserting the privilege. The individual's interest lies in waiving it.
Moreover, there may be several, or many, individual employees for whom waiver is the best
legal course. Under the subject matter test, thoese individuals being the "clients," they would
have the legal authority to waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation. Under the con-
trol group test, they would not. The latter would confine the waiver power to the body in
which it would normally be thought to reside-the control group.
213. Directors and officers of a corporation have a solemn fiduciary relationship to the
corporation and its shareholders, analogous to that of a trustee. Iowa S. Util. Co. v. United
States, 348 F.2d 492 (Ct. CL 1965); Alvest, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corp., 398 P.2d 213 (Alaska,
1965). See generally 3 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 884-
90 (1975). The directors have been held to be agents in whose care the shareholders place
their trust. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). Among the duties imposed as a result
of this special relationship is the obligation to discharge their duties with conscientiousness
and diligence. Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 140 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa
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corporation acts contrary to the fundamental assumption of the
subject matter test when it presumes that it has the exclusive right
to waive the privilege. Moreover, fiduciary principles which impel
corporate control groups to act in the best interests of the corpora-
tion will often conflict with the assertion that lower-level employ-
ees are "clients" and thereby may assert clients' rights as to waiver
of the attorney-client privilege.
The conflicts of interest persist, and may well be exacerbated,
through the litigation stage. At this stage, the government seeks to
compel production of the lawyer's interview notes and question-
naire results, and the corporation resists, asserting the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine. Lower-level employees
may then realize that the words they voluntarily gave at an earlier
time, are now sought to be compelled in a proceeding where their
employer cannot (and may not desire to) assert a Fifth Amend-
ment defense. To the extent that defense is available to the indi-
viduals,214 their rights have been eviscerated by the corporation.
The result is that in at least one of these investigations,215 the cor-
poration felt compelled to retain separate counsel for the individ-
ual employees. Aside from the troublesome conflict of interest
1966). Under these standards, the corporation's directors and officers would probably be in
violation of their duty of loyalty if their best efforts were not exerted to stem such an un-
authorized act.
214. Under present interpretations, the Fifth Amendment claim would probably be re-
jected, since the compulsion is directed toward a party with no Fifth Amendment privilege.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973). Nevertheless, the privilege is not completely lost to custodians of institutional
records. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 110 (1957).
215. See United States v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company, No. 77-118 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 9, 1977). As reported in Judge Foley's decision, the Internal Revenue Service was inves-
tigating a pattern of questionable payments by United Bank Corporation of New York
(UBC). It sent UBC the eleven "slush fund" questions, to which UBC responded by engag-
ing the accounting firm, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company, and the law firm, Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to conduct an internal investigation. Thirteen of the officers of
UBC and its subsidiaries who were interviewed were individually summoned by the Internal
Revenue Service. Most declined to respond to questioning on the basis of their Fifth
Amendment privilege. When the government sought enforcement of the summons issued to
Peat, Marwick for its copies of the interview notes, UBC intervened but did not assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the thirteen individual officers. Those individuals
appeared with four separate law firms to represent them in their efforts to intervene in the
suit, claiming among other things that the taxpayer could not properly represent their Fifth
Amendment interests. The court stated that any Fifth Amendment interests could be as-
serted at a later date, if the investigation ripened into a criminal charge and trial, and so
denied intervention.
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problems created here for the lawyer, it is no solution for the cor-
poration, having through its lawyers created a waiver of individual
Fifth Amendment rights, to provide its now incriminated employ-
ees with free counsel. Although the corporation might also assert
the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine at the en-
forcement stage, the same conflicts or potential conflicts described
above still loom.
Additional conflicts tend to widen the schism between the
identities and interests of the corporation and the non-control
group employees. The corporation's control group, at least the
board of directors, have a high fiduciary duty toward the corpora-
tion and its shareholders. That duty has been described as closely
analagous to that of a trustee; it includes the duty to act in good
faith for the corporation's best interests, and to give conscientious
care and one's best judgment to all corporate tasks. No such fiduci-
ary duties restrict the lower-level employees. If a corporate officer
or director is faithful to his oath, he will assiduously discover and
prosecute those responsible for his corporation's potential securi-
ties law and tax law violations. He will assert the corporation's in-
terest in all inquisitorial proceedings. He will discharge the indi-
viduals responsible for the malefactions. Non-control group
individuals will often have the very opposite incentives, particu-
larly where they participated in the corporation's misdeeds.
In view of all of these actual and potential conflicts of interest,
it is difficult to justify the contention that non-control group em-
ployees are so indentified with the interests of the corporation that
they ought to be considered "the clients." To the contrary, their
interests are deeply at odds with those of their employer. The sub-
ject matter test is therefore largely incompatible with the defini-
tion and concept of "client" that the attorney-client privilege is
supposed to foster.21
B. Other Canons and Rights
Canon 7217 mandates that a lawyer represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law. This general mandate includes the
duty to resolve in favor of his client all doubts as to the bounds of
216. See note 213 supra.
217. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7 (EC-7): "A Lawyer Should Represent
A Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."
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the law,218 the duty to assert permissible constructions of the law
which would be favorable to the client,21 9 the duty to assure that a
client's decision-making results from full information and careful
consideration of alternative courses,220 and the duty to advance the
client's cause before an administrative agency and to identify to
that agency the identity of his client (unless identity is privi-
leged).221 The lawyer who has been retained and paid by a corpora-
tion to conduct an internal investigation would have difficulty ful-
filling the letter and spirit of this canon. His "clients"' conflicting
interests arise not only between corporation and lower-level em-
ployees, but among these employees themselves, such as where one
implicates another in a questionable payments scheme. The lawyer
who obeys EC 5-18 (the corporation, not any employee, is the cli-
ent) and who therefore gives full loyalty to the corporation will
have, to that degree, a lessened ethical incentive to obey the com-
mands of Canon 7 as to the employees he has interviewed. Indeed
it is doubtful whether these individuals will be perceived as part of
the "client" before the subject matter test theory makes it conve-
nient to do S0.222
At the litigation stage, interviewee-employees will want to
assert the attorney-client privilege, work-product doctrine, Fifth
Amendment privilege, and similar defenses to compelled produc-
tion of their prior revelations. As discussed above, the corporation
has no Fifth Amendment privilege" s and may desire to waive
other protections.
If defenses to the investigations exist, the corporation may not
always wish to assert them. If the corporation seeks lenient treat-
ment under the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program, it may wish
to bare its secrets, to the potential detriment of the individual
non-control group employees. Only the corporation's interest is
218. Id., EC 7-3.
219. Id., EC 7-4.
220. Id., EC 7-8.
221. Id., EC 7-15.
222. Besides these conflicts, a host of others confront the lawyer who chooses to partici-
pate in corporate management as a director or officer. See Hershman, Special Problems of
Inside Counsel for Financial Institutions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1435 (1977); Note, Should Lawyers
Serve as Directors of Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel?, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 711
(1978); The Murky Divide: Professionalism and Professional Responsibility, 31 Bus. LAW.
457 (1975).
223. See note 207 supra.
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served under these circumstances. The corporation may wish to
avoid a criminal trial or civil proceedings by pleading to a charge
or settling a case, again forfeiting the interests of lower-level em-
ployees. Negotiations, bartering, and the like always find their way
into administrative investigations. A corporation potentially
chargeable with securities law violations or tax evasion would not
likely have an incentive to consider the additional burden of indi-
viduals' interests as its own.
The effect of the subject matter test is therefore also to set
one "client" against another, and one ethical canon against others.
It is difficult to justify a concept of the term "client," such as that
embodied in the subject matter test, which creates or exacerbates a
host of such ethical dilemmas.
These actual and potential conflicts of interest may also
impair the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel (assuming that right is available at the stage of a Criminal
Investigation Division investigation),224 or simply the non-constitu-
224. Whether it does so apply is not clear. The Supreme Court has indicated that ad-
vice of the "Miranda" rights, including the right to counsel, is not constitutionally required
when a Criminal Investigation Division inquiry is begun, unless the taxpayer is then the
subject of a custodial interrogation. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). There-
fore, no Fifth Amendment rights are at stake, and the IRS agent is not required to advise a
taxpayer of that right or his right to counsel. The decision does not state whether the latter
right applies, as a matter of constitutional law. However, in practice, and by Internal Reve-
nue Manual requirements, the "Miranda" warnings are in fact given. Even if not required,
where a right (constitutional or not) is conferred by IRS practice or procedure for the pro-
tection and benefit of the taxpayer, courts have usually held their violation as bars to gov-
ernment summonses. That principle, however, has been eroded, perhaps completely, by
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Some courts hold that the right to counsel
applies at any "critical" stage of a "prosecutorial chain of events"-where a defense must be
either asserted or lost, and where that result would derogate from a fair trial later on.
United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 742-44 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634 (Ind.
1975); State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (S.C. 1974). Certainly rights may be
waived or preserved during the investigation stage of an IRS proceeding'On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has hinged the adherence of the right to an adversary judicial proceed-
ing. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (four Justices concurring, a fifth in result only).
Such seemingly "investigatory" matters as electronic surveillance are not a "critical stage,"
even when the government knows at the time of the surveillance that the defendant has
retained a lawyer. United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 989 (1973). Moreover, in a questionable payments-ase, the investigation proceeds
privately.
Nevertheless, it remains true that, had the investigation been conducted by the IRS
instead of employer's lawyers, the employee-witnesses would have been advised of their
right to counsel, and the swift retention of counsel at the start of a criminal investigation is
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tional expectation and the ethical requirement that a lawyer will
render his most effective, unimpeded assistance. The employee's
best defense to a slush fund charge might be "superior orders," his
superiors being the guilty parties. But his lawyer, who represents
the corporation, might then urge that the employee's act were ul-
tra vires. Such a conflict in defenses in fact has arisen.2 5 An em-
ployee accused of wrongdoing might also seek immunity in ex-
change for testimony against the corporation, thereby placing his
interests in direct conflict with those of the corporation.226
The conclusion to be drawn from these potential defenses is
simple: counsel's assistance would not be "effective" under the
Constitution or Canon 7 if his loyalty is divided by potentially con-
flicting defenses.2 27 To represent both corporation and non-control
group employees in an internal payments investigation (or at trial)
irretrievably deprives both "clients" of the effective assistance of
counsel, whether viewed as a constitutional or purely ethical mat-
ter. Moreover, as a matter of policy the law should not encourage
representation where lawyers are in danger of violating ethical
canons, or where clients are deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel.22 8
the rule rather than the exception. Even if a questionable payments investigation does not
threaten the right to counsel as a matter of constitutional law, legal assistance and reliance
on legal advice is, undeniably, of considerable import as a matter of fairness. Lawyers have
an ethical obligation, analogous to the constitutional right to counsel, to provide the most
effective and zealous representation when called upon to do so. See generally EC 7-1 and
Canon 7.
225. United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998
(1977).
226. United States v. RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (Sherman Act
violations).
227. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Gongis, 374 F.2d
758, 761 (7th Cir. 1967). The law in this area has developed, not surprisingly, exclusively in
the criminal field. While there is doubt as to the existence of a constitutionally based Sixth
Amendment right in civil cases, there is no doubt that clients desire, expect and pay for
"effective" assistance of counsel. In this sense criminal law cases are instructive. In Glasser,
315 U.S. 60, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is denied his Sixth Amend-
ment right where his attorney represents a co-defendant as well. While refusing to fashion a
per se rule, in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Court acknowledged that the
Sixth Amendment is one of those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that its denial
can almost never be harmless error. See generally 55 A.B.A.J. 262 (Mar. 1969); Annot., 31
A.L.R.3d 715 (1970). See also Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir.
1971) (union counsel directed to withdraw because of conflicting interests with representa-
tion of officer); Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. II. 1975)
(shareholder derivative suit).
228. The A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards has proposed a
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V. WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The work-product doctrine must be carefully distinguished
new rule in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Rule (drafted before Upjohn) does not offer a solution to the dilemmas
posed by Upjohn. The proposed Rule provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained to represent an organization represents the
organization as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members, share-
holders, or other constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other per-
son associated with the organization is engaged in or intends action, or a refusal
to act in a matter related to the representation, that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in material injury to the or-
ganization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably appropriate to the best in-
terest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give
due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the
scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organi-
zation and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the
organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. The
measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption and the risk of a disclo-
sure of information relating to the representation of the organization. Such mea-
sures may include:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, includ-
ing, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest
authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by appli-
cable law.
(c) When a matter has been referred to the organization's highest authority in
accordance with paragraph (b), and that authority insists upon action, or a re-
fusal to act, that is clearly a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or
a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may take
further remedial action that the lawyer reasonably believes to be in the best
interest of the organization. Such action may include disclosure of information
relating to the representation of the organization only if the lawyer reasonably
believes that:
(1) the highest authority in the organization has acted to further the
personal or financial interests of members of that authority which are in
conflict with interests of the organization; and
(2) disclosure of the information is necessary in the best interest of the
organization.
(d) In dealing with an organization's officials and employees, a lawyer shall ex-
plain the identity of the client when necessary to avoid embarrassment or un-
fairness to them.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1-7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
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from the attorney-client privilege. 229 This statement bears empha-
sis because Upjohn has blurred this usually clear distinction. A
privilege, once proved and not waived, absolutely bars compelled
disclosure at whatever stage of representation it is asserted. The
work-product doctrine, however, is qualified. It can be pierced by a
showing of substantial need.230 The attorney-client privilege is
some four hundred years old.281 The work-product doctrine,
though said to be of ancient origin,232 has found practical expres-
sion and widespread application only in the last thirty-four
years.2as Courts have reviewed or evaluated the doctrine almost al-
ways in the context of pending litigation. It has also been codified
in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a rule applica-
ble after the start of litigation. By contrast, the attorney-client
privilege cases frequently deal with communications alleged to be
privileged at almost every stage of the client's representation.284
Moreover, the work-product doctrine protects primarily the attor-
ney, not the client. It nurtures and protects the attorney's freedom
of thought, investigation and expression, It is the attorney's to
create, to assert or to waive.
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court held that (1) the work-product
doctrine applies as a defense to an IRS administrative summons,
and that (2) with respect to lawyers' notes of interviews, one who
seeks to penetrate it must make a showing greater than substantial
need or inability to obtain the data by other means. In holding
that the doctrine applied to IRS investigations, the Court reasoned
that "[n]othing in the language of the IRS summons provisions or
required by Rule 1-7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented.
Upjohn in fact complicates the function of the rule by: 1) expanding rather than narrow-
ing the definition of "client," possibly beyond the corporation to include shareholders, etc.,
and 2) creating a quasi-attorney-client relationship between corporate counsel and non-con-
trol group personnel which is in obvious conflict with the attorney's predominant duty to
the. corporation and which may lead to the unseemly result of the non-control group per-
son's being sacrificed to the greater corporate good if, for example, the corporation seeks
shelter under the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program.
229. The doctrine was announced in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See gen-
erally Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352
(1967).
230. See E.I. DuPont v. Phillips Petroleum, 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959).
231. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 13.
232. 8 WiGMORE, supra note 13, § 2294.
233. 35 A.L.R.3d 412 (1970).
234. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 13.
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their legislative history suggests an intent on the part of Congress
to preclude application of the work-product doctrine. 23 5 Citing its
prior decision, Donaldson v. United States, 83 the Court observed
that the doctrine was encompassed in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which Rules were made applicable to summons
enforcement proceedings by Rule 81(a)(3). This reasoning departs
strikingly from the pro-enforcement tone the Court adopted in
United States v. Euge,3 7 where it held that handwriting exem-
plars could be compelled by summons. In Euge, the Court went to
great historical lengths to emphasize how liberally the summons
power should be construed. Time after time, the Court stated, that
power had been read to reach anything which qualified as "books,
papers, records and other data." The Court summarized its own
history in this field as follows:
As early as 1911, this Court established the benchmarks for interpreting the
authority of the Internal Revenue Service to enforce tax obligations in hold-
ing that, "the administration of the statute may well be taken to embrace all
appropriate measures for its enforcement, [unless] there is .. . substantial
reason for assigning to the phrase[s]... a narrower interpretation." United
States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 269. This precise mode of construction
has consistently been applied by this Court in construing the breadth of the
summons authority Congress intended to confer in § 7602.... There is thus
a formidable line of precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the
claimed enforcement authority of the Service if such authority is necessary
for the effective enforcement of the revenue laws and is not undercut by con-
trary legislative purposes.238
235. 449 U.S. at 398. The Court also assumed another conclusion of profound signifi-
cance. In citing Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court appeared to sanction
the application of these rules at a stage earlier than the trial of a lawsuit. Nowhere in the
entire field of summons enforcement litigation (and possibly in administrative law) is there
such an indication that rules explicitly formulated for the conduct of trials will have appli-
cation at the agency's investigative stage. This dictum may create difficulties for the IRS, if
not for other investigative agencies, for years to come as lawyers attempt to use the evidence
rules as bars to agency investigative techniques. Yet the Court gave no hint that it consid-
ered the propriety of exporting the Federal Rules of Evidence to such foreign territory. As
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular the work-product doctrine, the
Court noted that the Government "wisely" conceded their application.
The traditional operation of an administrative agency investigative process sanctions an
inequality of rights between the contenders. This is in direct contrast to the democracy of
formal civil litigation, where both parties, even the Government, are equal before the court.
236. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
237. 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
238. Id. at 714-16. See also United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976) (com-
puter tapes).
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In Euge, the Court found a summons to be enforceable if its
purpose was not specifically forbidden by statute or policy; in
Upjohn, a general policy which applied to litigation-stage discov-
ery-not specific to the summons power-was sufficient to prevent
enforcement. These conflicting positions may be reconciled by con-
struing Rule 26(b)(3) as a "specific" prohibition or the embodi-
ment of a substantial countervailing policy. However, the Court
only alluded to this argument."" The Court failed to cite Euge's
forceful and unequivocal language, nor did it explain how Rule
26(b)(3) qualifies as a "specific" prohibition on the summons
power.24 0 While Rule 81(a)(3) does make the civil rules generally
applicable to the judicial enforcement of a summons, cases in this
field-including cases decided by the Supreme Court and cases in-
volving other aspects of Rule 26-endorse with near unanimity the
opposite conclusion. Those cases stand for the proposition that de-
spite Rule 81(1)(3), nothing in the civil rules regarding such mat-
ters as complaints,24 1 Rule 4 summonses,24 2 discovery,243 or even
trials,4 will stand in the way of summary proceedings for the en-
forcement of IRS summonses. Indeed the case cited by the Upjohn
239. The 'strong public policy' underlying the work-product doctrine was reaf-
firmed recently in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975), and has
been substantially incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(3).
As we stated last Term, the obligation imposed by a tax summons remains
'subject to the traditional privileges and limitations,' United States v. Euge, 444
U.S. 707 (1980). Nothing in the language of the IRS summons provisions or their
legislative history suggests an intention on the part of Congress to preclude ap-
plication of the work-product doctrine.
449 U.S. at 398 [footnote omitted].
This statement of the Court's must be contrasted with the language of Euge and LaSalle
National Bank. Those two cases, and LaSalle in particular, interpret the summons power to
reach anything not specifically forbidden. In Upjohn, the Court does an about-face: if not
permitted, the summons is forbidden.
Moreover, courts have never sanctioned application of other Civil Rules to thwart the
summons authority. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (Rule 24 intervention);
Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp. 190, 194-95 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (Jury trial, Rule 37); United
States v. Gajewski, 419 F.2d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 1969) (Rule 4 Summons and Complaint);
United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 822, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1979) (Rule 26 discovery).
240. Sections 7605 (b), (c) and 7603, for example, contain specific restrictions on the
summons authority.
241. See 419 F.2d 1088. See also note 239 supra.
242. Id.
243. See also United States v. Garden St. Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1979).
244. See generally id.
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Court-Donaldson v. United States24 5 -is taken out of context. In
Donaldson, the Supreme Court denied the taxpayer's attempt to
invoke Rule 24 to intervene in a summons enforcement case
against his employer. In so doing, the Court said:
The Civil Rules, of course, do have an application to a summons proceeding.
Rule 81(a)(3) expressly so provides. But the Civil Rules are not inflexible in
this application. Rule 81(a)(3) goes on specifically to recognize that a district
court, by local rule or by order, may limit the application of the rules in a
summons proceeding .... This feature was recognized as purposeful by the
Advisory Committee when the pertinent language was added to Rule 81(a)(3)
in 1946 .... The post-Powell cases, too, are clearly and consistently to the
effect that the footnote in Powell was not intended to impair a summary en-
forcement proceeding so long as the rights of the party summoned are pro-
tected .... 2
Thus the Court's conclusion that the work-product doctrine ap-
plies to an IRS summons is not supported by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure nor by the Court's previous summon enforcement
cases.
With respect to the specific summoned data-interview notes
and memoranda-the Upjohn Court held that Rule 26's work-
product protection applied, but outwardly refused to decide what
standard of need was required to overcome it. The Court also rea-
soned that the attorney-client privilege applied to verbatim inter-
view notes.247 However, as to the lawyer's notes, the Court argua-
bly read Hickman v. Taylor to mean that no showing of necessity
could justify their production.248 Since the interview notes by ne-
cessity revealed "the attorney's mental processes, '249 disclosure
was permitted, but not "simply on a showing of substantial need
and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.
2 0
Some "far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by
other means '25 1 was required.
By holding that almost no showing of necessity could over-
come the work-product protection for a lawyer's recordation of wit-
nesses' oral statments, the Court may have effectively created a
245. 400 U.s. 517 (1971).
246. Id. at 528-29.
247. 449 U.S. at 400.
248. Such was not the holding of the case. See note 252 infra.
249. 449 U.S. at 400.
250. Id. at 401.
251. Id. at 402.
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true privilege from a previously qualified one. From now on, a law-
yer may successfully claim work-product protection for non-verba-
tim notes of a witnesses' statements, if he proves that he took
them in continuing confidence. This holding appears to expand
Hickman beyond its original confines, and beyond the borders of
some appellate decisions that interpret it.2 52 However, by ex-
panding the scope of the work-product doctrine, the Court has
ironically undercut the rationale for the broad attorney-client priv-
ilege rule it announced earlier in the case-candor. The Court's
near absolute protection for recorded witness statements creates
an incentive for the lawyer to write down what was previously
unwritten.25
252. In Hickman, three categories of data were sought: statements written and signed
by witnesses, the attorney's unrecorded impressions of witness interviews, and the attorney's
recorded memoranda of some of those interviews. As to the last two categories, the Court
decided that where "only a naked, general demand" was made, and where the only purpose
for obtaining the statements was "to help [the lawyer] prepare himself to examine witnesses
and to make sure that he has overlooked nothing," 329 U.S. at 512, 513, and where "the
essence of what petitioner seeks either has been revealed to him already through the inter-
rogatories or is readily available to him direct from the witnesses for the asking," 329 U.S. at
509, the Court did not believe that any showing of necessity could be made "under the
circumstances of this case" and "[u]nder ordinary conditions." 329 U.S. at 512. This limita-
tion did not preclude piercing the shield if more was shown. See 329 U.S. at 509, 511.
253. Opinion work product, consisting of a lawyer's reasoning and legal opinion, and
analyses or assessments of a client's position, is still entitled to an absolute protection. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3); Sun Company, 599 F.2d at 1231. Interview notes were not, prior to
Upjohn, absolutely forbidden from disclosure, but the protection to be accorded was greater
than that for questionnaire results. The former may reveal the attorney's mental processes,
i.e., his opinion work product. 599 F.2d at 1231. Their reliability is the product of many
factors, including the conditions of the interview, editorial discretion and the time at which
the notes are reduced to memoranda form. Id. Moreover, their discovery creates a danger of
converting the attorney from advocate to witness. The matter had been left open by Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101, which provides in part:
(b) Proceedings generally. These rules apply generally to civil actions and
proceedings, including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases and pro-
ceedings, to contempt proceedings except those in which the court may act sum-
marily, and to proceedings and cases under the Bankruptcy Act.
(c) Rule of privilege. The rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages
of all actions, cases, and proceedings.
(d) Rules Inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privilege) do not
apply in the following situations:
(2) Grand Jury. Proceedings before grand juries.
Fed. R. Evid. 1101.
The court in John Doe, Inc., conceded that the work-product doctrine was not strictly a
privilege, 599 F.2d at 509, but noted that it had been applied to grand jury proceedings,
citing In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Matter of Rosenbaum, 401 F.
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These inconsistencies call into question the desirability of ap-
plying the work-product doctrine prior to litigation or at the ad-
ministrative level. The doctrine was announced in a case where the
lawyer's work-product was generated in direct anticipation of liti-
gation following a boat accident. Such a setting is a civil suit where
the issues are sharply defined, the litigants are equal before the
court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply equally to
both sides.
In contrast, the nature of an administrative investigation, and
particularly an IRS investigation, is far different.2 " The investiga-
tion is often wide-ranging and the issues not well-defined until the
investigation is well under way.2 5 Issues of "discoverability" do
not arise often, and the "admissibility" of evidence is simply not
pertinent.2 56 The investigation is said to be inquisitorial, not accu-
satorial, in part because the IRS audits tax returns which may be
several years old and because the taxpayer is usually in control or
possession of all the facts.2 57 The Supreme Court has often
endorsed this characterization of IRS and other administrative
investigations.2 58
Supp. 807, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); and Sun Company, which also declared the availability of
the work-product doctrine as a defense to a grand jury subpoena. Nothing in the legislative
history of the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to suggest that Rule 1101 was intended to
encompass the work-product doctrine.
254. The fact that the issue is addressed in the context of a summons enforcement suit
does not convert an administrative inquiry into an accusatorial judicial proceeding. The gov-
ernment's suit to enforce the summons is designed to be a temporary detour from the ad-
ministrative track, a summary proceeding with a judicial and legislative preference on the
calendar. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); United States v. Davey, 426
F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1979); 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h). Once the summoned data is obtained, the
administrative investigation goes forward.
255. United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420, 430-31 (N.D. IM. 1972), afl'd, 478 F.2d
1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
256. In Re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953):
Such investigatory inquiry by a Government agent is not a judicial proceed-
ing .... Even administrative agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, the
Labor Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission have never been re-
stricted by the rigid rules of evidence applicable in courts of law ... [There is
even less reason to restrict the revenue agent's inquiry by technical rules of
evidence.
Id. at 123. (Footnote and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has stated on at least one
occasion that the rules of evidence do not restrict agency inquiries. Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948). But see note 235 supra.
257. United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), afl'd, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1973).
258. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 638-41, 647-51 (1950); Federal
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Moreover, public policy does not structure an equality of in-
terests or rights in administrative inquiries as it does in most law-
suits. Congress grants the agency extremely wide-ranging powers of
inquiry, limited only by constitutional and other liberally-con-
strued boundaries. For example, section 7601 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code directs the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate "to
the extent he deems it practicable" to cause Treasury Department
officers or employees "to proceed . . . and inquire after and con-
cerning all persons [ ] who may be liable to pay any internal reve-
nue tax .... ,25 9 The Supreme Court has characterized the collec-
tion of the revenue as the "life-blood of government, '2 0 and has
often given voice to Congressional policy that the revenue laws,
both civil and criminal, be vigorously enforced.2 61 This 'principle
holds true for other agencies, even to the extent that some consti-
tutional rights are of questionable application at the administra-
tive level.262 The effect of this policy at the administrative level is
to create a disparity between the powers granted to the IRS and
the protections retained by taxpayers. The latter are routinely ex-
pected to display their records and knowledge upon request or
upon the command of a summons.263 At the same time, it is recog-
nized that the outcome of the administrative process may vary
Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948); Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 39-41 (1904).
259. 26 U.S.C. § 7601.
260. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
261. Section 7601 imposes on the IRS the "duty to canvass and to inquire." Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. at 523.
262. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, rehearing
denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946) (corporations subject to "visitorial power" of state
over Fourth Amendment claims). For example, there is no requirement of probable cause
precedent to an agency's right to investigate matters within its jurisdiction. It need only
show that the investigation is legitimate and the subpoenaed documents relevant. 327 U.S.
at 209; Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Brigadoon Scotch Dist. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-
54 (2d Cir. 1973). In the case of an IRS summons, there are two easily met additional re-
quirements to show that the summoned data are not in the IRS' possession and that the
administrative steps for issuance and service have been followed. United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 56-58 (1964). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that it is up to the affected
agency, rather than the agent, to establish its own jurisdiction to investigate through its
procedures. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1943).
263. This expectation derives from the general duty to obey promptly the commands of
a summons. United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Minn. 1973); In re D.I.
Operating Co., 240 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D. Nev. 1965) (quoting Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919)).
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widely.26 An audit by the Examination Division of the IRS may
cover one or a dozen tax issues, and result in a refund, a deficiency,
or one or more penalties.2 5 An investigation by the Criminal In-
vestigation Division may have these outcomes or may result in a
recommendation for criminal prosecution of the taxpayer. The
powers and protections available to each side are intentionally
unequal.2 6
6
In particular, administrative agencies' powers to subpoena
documents, take testimony under oath, and require the submission
of reports, are likewise extensive.267
Administrative agencies also have an oversight role, which fur-
ther distinguishes them from civil litigation. When the latter en-
gage in a dispute over a transaction (e.g., a contract), the two par-
ties have been participants and have some, or even equal,
knowledge of the facts. Thus, the party seeking to pierce the work-
product shield will often have some specific knowledge of the form
or content of the documents it seeks or the events of the transac-
tion involved. This equality of knowledge rarely exists in an IRS or
other administrative investigation. There the subject often has ex-
clusive knowledge and control. It is difficult, therefore, for the IRS
to state the specific grounds on which it claims it needs a docu-
ment it may have never seen.2 ' These policy considerations ought
to point to the nonrecognition of the work-product doctrine earlier
than at the trial level, or at least to a lessening of the showing of
264. 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, §§ 1901-1904 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as MEziNEs].
265. See note 35 supra.
266. The agency proceeds informally, by investigation rather than adjudication. This
flexibility of procedure is said to be desirable because of the inquisitorial, fact-finding na-
ture of the agency. See Hannah v. Larche, 421 U.S. 420; Brotherhood of Ry. & S.C. v. Asso-
ciation for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965); Inland Empire Dist.
Council LSWU v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 803 (1945); National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Botony Worsted Mills, 133 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 751 (1943). See note 258 supra.
267. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Smith, 245 U.S. 33 (1917); Harriman v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Top Value Meats v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 586
F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Statutory author-
ity and wide ranging scope of agency powers are contained, for example, in 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(1) (1976) (NLRB); 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (FTC); 49 U.S.C. § 305(d) (1976) (ICC); 15
U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1976) (SEC). See generally United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.
1980), on the contrast between the allocation of rights at the administrative and litigation
stages of a criminal case.
268. See Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420.
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need required to overcome it. 269
Cases which recognize the work-product doctrine reflect some
of the same policy concerns as those in the attorney-client privilege
area.270 They note that lawyers will be unable or unwilling to
render the required, that is, the most effective, counsel if their
thoughts, facts, and investigative efforts are open to view,27 1 or
that they will Simply not write down that which needs to be writ-
ten, resulting in the sameor similar damage to the system.7 2
Unlike the suggested effects of the subject matter and control
group tests, evaluation of this proposition does in fact suffer from
an absence of empirical data. There appears to be no empirical
study which has attempted to quantify the extent to which lawyers
will diminish their efforts because of the hypothetical unavailabil-
ity of the work-product defense. The available evidence from the
cases indicates that lawyers in fact wrote down and communicated
the results of the internal investigations. But this result is of little
significance since the scope of the work-product defense, if consid-
ered at all, was not made clear. The cases simply do not show
whether the lawyers believed they had a work-product protection,
or whether they even perceived the potential challenge to it as a
danger.
However, it is possible to make projections about the dangers
Hickman and other courts perceived. The doctrines' supporters ar-
gue that legal efforts would suffer if work product were easily dis-
coverable, that is, "what is now put down in writing would remain
unwritten. 2 7 3 But there is no work-product difference between the
knowledge in an attorney's memory and the same knowledge re-
duced to writing.7 4 Each is equally subject to discovery to the ex-
tent work-product itself is discoverable. The argument must there-
fore be that lawyers will stop creating work-product altogether.275
269. See id.; United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
270. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
271.- See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1190 (D.S.C. 1974).
272. See 329 U.S. at 511.
273. Id.
274. Later memories may fade, but the case does not distinguish between oral and writ-
ten work-product. To the extent that oral work-product is argued to be less reliable because
it is given well after the events, the justification for the application of the work-product
doctrine is lessened, because the "sacrosanct" nature of the knowledge has been eroded.
275. If it were somehow possible for a law firm to conduct an Upjohn-type internal
investigation without the use of written materials altogether, and to render its report orally
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This outcome is probable only if the dangers of abandoning work-
product protection outweigh those forces impelling the investiga-
tion in the first place.278
However, once the SEC or IRS becomes involved in a corpo-
rate investigation, a partial resolution may take place in the way of
consent orders, suits, or relief under the Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram. Upjohn Company and other corporations evidently believed
the danger of SEC inquiry or shareholder suits to be so great that
they did not wait for the onset of the agency's inquiry. The poten-
tial liabilities, whether explicit or not, of shareholder derivative
suits, SEC Rule 10-b(5)2 77 or other litigation, fines, penalties,278 de-
listings, and the like, are the corporation's preeminent considera-
tions. The countervailing danger-that disclosure of attorney
work-product may lead ulimately to criminal tax penalties-may
appear far more remote at the time.27 9 Thus, to the extent thinking
in the boardroom is focused and aired at all, it is more likely than
not that the dangers of non-disclosure are seen as harsher and less
remote than the reverse. Considerations which would likely impel
corporations to generate disclosable data in the normal course of
business, or even to commence internal investigations, would be
present with respect to the work-product doctrine. Corporations
need and demand written attorney work-product simply because of
independent, overriding business and legal considerations.
A. Standard for Substantial Need
Since Upjohn has held that an IRS summons is subject to the
work-product defense, there remains a question of what standard
of need must be shown in order to override it.
to the Board of Directors, protection would still not be available. The lawyer's thoughts,
facts, opinions and the like would still be work-product, and indeed could be subject to
summons or subpoena from the lawyer or from the Board.
276. Of course, there is the added likelihood that few lawyers would wish to put them-
selves out of business by advising the client they did not wish to undertake the
investigation.
277. Securities Act of 1933, Sec. 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Sec. 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1981).
278. The penalties include criminal prosecution of corporation and individuals, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77u(d), 77ff(a) (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1976).
279. [1979] LR.S. Ann. Rep. 22 (1979). The report notes that about one in three Crimi-
nal Investigation Division investigations resulted in a recommendation for prosecution.
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The Supreme Court suggested that a stronger showing of ne-
cessity and unavailability would be required than the traditional
standard or than that made by the Government in Upjohn. The
Government had shown that the subject witnesses were widely
scattered around the world. It had also proved the company's ac-
tive hindrance of the interview process by its instructions to em-
ployees not to speak on any topic which the company considered
irrelevant to the IRS's investigation. 0 In light of these facts, the
Court's conclusion that sufficient need had not been established
strains credulity. The Court could have, but did not, take judicial
notice of additional facts. (1) The passage of time would have
made stale whatever interviews the IRS could now obtain, whereas
the events involved were far fresher to the witnesses at the time of
the interviews. (2) Any employee-witness is likely to perceive the
IRS as hostile; employees loyal to their corporation probably did
so. (3) In tax matters, the primary source of facts is the taxpayer;
in the questionable payments area, the practices are by nature
even more secret.
Perhaps the Court would now require that the witness be
dead,281 or that he refuse to answer questions on grounds of self-
incrimination.282 It may be that the Government would be required
to show that the continuance of the investigation depended on ac-
cess to those interviews, or that it had made attempts to summon
the witnesses but they had refused to respond.2 8  Each of these
requirements would impose greater burdens than the courts have
generally imposed since Hickman.
B. What Should the Standard Be to Overcome the Work-
Product Defense?
Public policy considerations favoring swift and vigorous en-
forcement of administrative process, and the inherent features of
280. That judgment is generally consigned to the IRS. United States v. Acker, 325 F.
Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
281. See Sun Company, 599 F.2d 1224.
282. Whether the obstruction is grounded on the Fifth Amendment privilege or the
claim of irrelevance, the result is the same.
283. See Hickman v. Taylor. "Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden
in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of
one's case, discovery may be properly had.... And production might be justified where the
witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty." 329 U.S. at 511.
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an administrative inquiry,2" should be fundamental considerations
in determining when the work-product defense should and should
not be available. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Brown 8 5
has recently considered the issue. There the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's enforcement of an IRS summons for
an accountant's notes and workpapers.286 The district court had
stated that the IRS's showing of need to overcome the valid asser-
tion of work-product protection should be less than the showing
required of an ordinary litigant.2 87 The district court focused on
four factors: (1) the general policy that access to information pro-
motes justice in administrative proceedings just as it does in litiga-
tion; (2) the importance of IRS investigations to the integrity and
equity of the tax system; (3) the intent of Congress to give the IRS
a wide-ranging field of inquiry and powerful tools to accomplish
the task; and (4) the inability of the IRS to know, initially, the
nature, importance and relevance of documents it seeks, or even to
know what data to seek-and the corollary that the facts are
largely or even exclusively within the taxpayer's knowledge or con-
trol. The court formulated this rule: where a party resists disclo-
sure on work-product grounds, the IRS satisfies an initial burden
to show need by making a good faith declaration that the docu-
ments are believed to be necessary to the determination of the tax-
payer's correct tax liabilities and that it believes the information
cannot be obtained from any other source.288 The burden then
shifts again to the party asserting the right to withhold evidence to
disprove these assertions.
This procedure appears to be a reasonable compromise. It ef-
fectively shifts the burden of proving a negative-lack of need
and/or the presence of an alternative source-but the shift is to
the party in control of the facts. In a corporate sensitive payments
investigation, it will almost always be possible for the IRS's inves-
tigating agent to declare in good faith that he has no alternative
sources289 and that he needs the data; the slush fund is by defini-
284. 3 MEZINrS, supra note 264, §§ 1901-03.
285. 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973), afg 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See also Sun
Company, 599 F.2d 1224.
286. 478 F.2d at 1040-41.
287. See id. at 1041.
288. 349 F. Supp. at 431.
289. Such a declaration, if not proof, is effectively a requirement of the showing of need
in any event. See Sun Company, 599 F.2d 1224.
1981]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion clandestine both in operation and in accounting.2 90 The inves-
tigating agent would nevertheless be under a duty to make an ac-
tual good faith effort to find and interview the employees
themselves, perhaps to the extent of issuing summonses to them.
On the other hand, the corporation itself is the party which
knows the pertinence to or effect on tax returns and liabilities of
the summoned data. It would obviously know the contents of inter-
view notes, questionnaires and appended accounting data. It would
therefore be in a better position to evaluate the summoned data's
effect on the IRS's investigation and to prove lack of necessity. It
would not be unfair to place such a burden on the corporation.
Brown places the burden of proving the work-product defense back
on the traditional party-the party in control of the facts.
While Brown's adoption of a reduced showing of need in the
context of an IRS summons comports with the underlying princi-
ple that need must be shown to defeat the work-product defense,
the argument may compel the rejection of the defense altogether
when applied specifically to an agency investigation of a corpora-
tion's questionable payments practices. The cases which explicate
the principle of "substantial need" can be distilled to two simple
tests. (1) Does the party seeking discovery have an alternative to
raiding opposing counsel's files? (2) Has the alternative been
tried?29 1 Some courts hold that sufficient need is shown simply be-
cause one party has exclusive control over the facts, or exclusive or
superior opportunity to ascertain the facts. 92 Under this liberal
view of need, the court need be convinced only that the beneficial
objectives of pre-trial discovery will be achieved, 98 or that the in-
formation sought is directly in issue and the need for it compel-
ling.29 Such factors as lapse of time, likely hostility of, witnesses,
290. Few employees know about it; fewer would likely be willing to talk. Employees
would be naturally reluctant to disclose their malefactions, not only because the disclosure
could subject them to personal criminal liability, but also because their corporate employer
would also be exposed to liability. Moreover, as noted elsewhere, the IRS investigates
several years after the events, further complicating a delicate investigation.
291. Indeed, several courts have framed the standard of need in terms not of the wit-
ness' availability or the seeker's efforts, but in terms of the uniqueness of the documents
sought. Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 49 F.R.D. 54, 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). The documents generated by the corporations in their questionable payments investi-
gations can easily be seen to be unique. See note 30 supra.
292. People of State of California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
293. Crowe v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 29 F.R.D. 148, 151 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
294. Bird v. Penn Central Co., 61 F.R.D. 43.
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and control of alternatives by the other party, would go to the
determination of whether there was a compelling need for the
information. 95
In an IRS administrative investigation or any other agency in-
quiry into a corporation's questionable payments practices, all of
these elements would be present. The only practically available
source for the facts would be the target corporation itself. More-
over, since the payments would be concealed by design in fictitious
accounts or hidden by other means, no alternative domestic source
(e.g., land records, unambiguous bank records, etc.) would exist.
Not only would the information the agency sought be vital to its
case, but also it would be the very reason for the investigation
itself.
CONCLUSION
The Upjohn decision has undoubtedly caused major corpora-
tions and their counsel to breathe a collective sigh of relief. Despite
the Supreme Court's disclaimers to the contrary, it has in fact
fashioned very broad rules, and while the Court's reasoning is sub-
ject to question, at least the law is clear. As one commentator has
put it: "The opinion solves the problem for me of whether I can
talk to low-level personnel. The answer is yes. '2 8
But like so many broad rules, Upjohn may carry the seeds of
its own modification. The decision itself is a blueprint, an expert's
guide, for the fabrication of privilege, and lawyers are likely to em-
ploy that blueprint in unintended ways. There will now be a strong
incentive and temptation to shield anything remotely sensitive by
funneling it through an attorney's interview or investigation. A
danger that the opponents of the subject matter test have fore-
seen-management's possible "hear no evil, see no evil" atti-
tude-may take on the spectre of harsh reality. That prospect of
an ever-broadening "zone of silence" finds support in the Court's
acknowledgment that so many aspects of modern corporate behav-
ior require legal guidance. This statement would, of course, be es-
pecially true for matters known to be "sensitive" in the first place.
295. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 127-31 (5th Cir. 1968), rehearing
denied, 408 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit would not even require the moving
party to proceed by way of depositions first.
296. Huffman, Upjohn Tells How to Ensure Privilege for all Employees, Legal Times
of Washington, Jan. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
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The Court's brave new world of privilege will thus spawn diffi-
culties for the district courts and courts of appeals for years to
come. Both in private civil and in criminal litigation, it is likely
that courts will see the very careful crafting of cocoon-tight privi-
lege claims by the deliberate redirection of data through lawyers.
Such an incentive and temptation-due solely to the inherent
features of the subject matter test effectively adopted by the
Court--appear to be of questionable compatibility with the tradi-
tional conception of the attorney-client privilege.
The Court's refusal to bifurcate the concept of "client" in the
corporate area also may breed problems for lawyers. Potential con-
flicts of interest and problems of multiple representation always
loom in the course of the representation of corporations. Now that
the Supreme Court has declared all employees to be protectable,
the potential for conflicts of interest will multiply.
In the end, the pattern of future cases may well show a retreat
from the Upjohn rules, or at least their limitation, when difficul-
ties of discovery and potential conflicts of interest start to prevent
effective truth-finding. The courts are not likely to tolerate for long
a set of rules which has the potential, in the hands of imaginative
lawyers, to undercut the courts' effective functioning. Such a pro-
cess, however, as the Supreme Court said in Upjohn, must be
worked out on a case-by-case basis. The Upjohn rules will thus be
with the courts for years to come.
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